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OPENING THE COURTROOM DOORS FOR MIGRANT WORKERS: 
THE NEED FOR A NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS 
AMENDMENT TO THE MIGRANT AND SEASONAL 
AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I am a real migrant worker.  I earned that name.  I been knocked down 
with the bruise.  I been kicked down with the bumps.  I fell a lot.  I rolled.  
Yes, I stumbled.  I got my little nose scarred up.  I got knocked in the head.”1  
This is the tale of the migrant farm worker.  Migrant farm work is not easy by 
any stretch of the imagination.2  Farm labor consists of hazardous activities and 
“consistently ranks with mining and construction work as one of the most 
dangerous occupations in the United Sates.”3  Migrant workers must traverse 
this large nation in search of employment, and upon finding it, they are often 
uncertain how long the work will last, thus unsure of their continued ability to 
earn income.4 
In America, the conditions of migrant farm work are rarely discussed, and, 
therefore, few Americans are aware of “the key role [migrant workers] play in 
our lives.”5  Yet the United States government was, and is, well aware of the 
frequent mistreatment of migrant workers.  This awareness led to federal 
legislation guaranteeing migrant workers protection from the detrimental 
activities affecting them.6  What good are such federal rights, however, if they 
 
 1. DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF MIGRANT 
FARMWORKERS TODAY 2 (1998) (presenting a migrant worker’s recollections of his work 
conditions). 
 2. See Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest 
Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 577-78 (2001). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 578. 
 5. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 
(2000) [hereinafter AWPA]. 
[T]he purpose of [the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act is] to 
remove the restraints on commerce caused by activities detrimental to migrant and 
seasonal agricultural workers; to require farm labor contractors to register under this 
[Act]; and to assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, 
agricultural associations, and agricultural employers. 
Id. § 1801. 
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cannot be asserted in courts of law?7  This is the major threat facing migrant 
workers. 
Imagine the following: A farm owner in state A, believing that he is in 
need of out-of-state workers because of a labor shortage in state A, hires 
employees from state B for temporary work on his farm in state A.  Farm 
workers from state B then travel to state A and toil at their tasks in the fields.  
Suppose also that the farm owner in state A, disregarding federal legislation, 
takes advantage of the migrant workers.8  Because it is highly unlikely that a 
migrant worker will seek legal recourse before his source of valuable income 
has been exhausted, the migrant worker will have to return to his home in state 
B before pursing legal action.  If he is aware that his rights were violated, he 
will then file a lawsuit in a court within the jurisdiction of forum state B.  
However, a major obstacle that the migrant worker will face is the very real 
possibility that the courts in forum state B will be unwilling to assert personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant farm owner because of a lack of minimum 
contacts.9  Under this scenario, migrant workers’ rights are of little value.  It 
will be unlikely that they will be able to assert their rights in the courts of state 
B, and it is further unlikely that such a low-paid occupational group will be 
able to muster the resources to litigate a claim in the farm owner’s state A.10  
This Comment focuses on the problems arising from this common scenario. 
In April 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most recent 
appellate decision regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction and migrant 
workers, Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farm, Inc.11  Ochoa involved a personal 
jurisdiction issue in a migrant worker context quite similar to the scenario 
detailed above.  While the Ochoa decision allowed for the reasonable exercise 
of in personam jurisdiction by the court in Arizona over a New York farm 
owner, the Ochoa court relied on an agency theory between the labor 
contractor and the farm owner,12 and, therefore, it would have been decided 
differently had such agency relationship not existed.  More importantly, Ochoa 
 
 7. See Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (holding that “[t]he 
right to sue and defend in the courts” is a right in a society that is “conservative of all other rights, 
and lies at the foundation of orderly government”). 
 8. Often this may be done by providing substandard housing or by failing to pay the 
migrant worker federal- or state-mandated minimum wages.  The migrant worker feels as though 
no recourse is possible because of his “lack of opportunity in alternative occupations,” thus 
leaving the worker with a sense of being “trapped” in his place of employment.  See FARM 
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (C.E. Bishop ed., 1967). 
 9. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (concluding that personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is proper when the defendant has minimum contacts in 
the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). 
 10. See Holley, supra note 2, at 580. 
 11. 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 12. Id. at 1189-92. 
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is an example of the unpredictable nature that exists with respect to asserting 
personal jurisdiction in the migrant worker cases.  Lacking the foreseeability as 
to whether minimum contacts will be found to exist between the distant farm 
owner, the litigation, and the forum state will hamper the effectiveness of 
migrant workers asserting their federal rights in court. 
To prevent the problem of unpredictability in constitutionally asserting 
personal jurisdiction over farm employers in the migrant worker context and to 
allow migrant workers better access to the courts of the United States in order 
to litigate their claims under federal law, this Comment will argue for an 
amendment to the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act13 
(“AWPA”) allowing for nationwide service of process when a claim under the 
AWPA is brought in a federal district court.  To protect the due process rights 
of the defendant farm owner from being unreasonably burdened by being 
forced to litigate in a distant forum, Congress should amend the AWPA to 
allow for service of process on non-resident defendants when such jurisdiction 
over the person would be reasonable, as similarly interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.14 
Although a per se reasonable nationwide service of process statute would 
eradicate any unpredictability in asserting personal jurisdiction—because 
personal jurisdiction would simply always exist—any amendment to the 
AWPA cannot trump a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Due Process rights,15 
which are, of course, of constitutional magnitude.  Congress, however, should 
put the burden of proving an unreasonable assertion of personal jurisdiction 
upon the defendant, thereby presuming that personal jurisdiction will be 
constitutional, per the nationwide service of process amendment.  In this case, 
the unpredictability in finding personal jurisdiction that has plagued the 
migrant worker cases will be greatly diminished, thus providing migrants 
greater access to the courts. 
Part II of this Comment will analyze the AWPA, and introduce the 
provisions that protect migrant workers as well as the remedies available when 
 
 13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (2000). 
 14. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
1.  See also infra note 17. 
 15. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  It is 
the Fifth Amendment’s—not the Fourteenth’s—Due Process Clause that is implicated when 
Congress grants federal courts the power to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants in claims 
concerning federally-created rights, because the Fourteenth Amendment is a restriction on state 
jurisdiction while the Fifth Amendment is a restriction on federal jurisdiction.  See Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1985); Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 
259 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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defendants in the farm community, such as farm owners, violate those 
provisions.  Even though this Comment focuses on the procedural aspect of 
asserting the AWPA in court—not the substance of the AWPA itself—the 
AWPA is introduced because it is the primary federal statute that guarantees 
the rights of migrant workers.16  Part III will analyze the United States 
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine by providing a chronological 
analysis of the minimum contacts doctrine.  Additionally, the Court’s 
reasonableness of jurisdiction factors will be discussed alongside the minimum 
contacts analysis because the Court has stated that such an analysis is also of 
constitutional magnitude.17  Next, Part IV narrows the focus of personal 
jurisdiction to the context of migrant workers by analyzing the four cases in 
this area that have made their way to the appellate level.  These cases are 
Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc.,18 Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc.,19 
Chery v. Bowman,20 and Aviles v. Kunkle.21  This Part demonstrates that a 
nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA is necessary in order 
to prevent migrant workers from being barred procedurally from bringing suits 
against farm owners.  The discussion in Part IV also points out the 
 
 16. Most cases adjudicating the substantive rights of migrant workers focus on the AWPA.  
See, e.g., Medrano v. D’Arrigo Bros. Co. of Cal., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Herrera 
v. Singh, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (E.D. Wash. 2000). 
 17. In addition to the minimum contacts analysis, the Supreme Court has held that courts 
must, in considering the assertion of personal jurisdiction, examine: 
“the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” 
“the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and 
the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.” 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980)).  See also infra Part III. 
  It is clear that such an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause can 
never be narrowed to a bright line rule including only minimum contacts because the Court has 
held that the factors regarding the reasonableness of a constitutional assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant are, in fact, dependant upon the outcome of the 
minimum contacts test.  See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (holding that the five factors of the 
reasonable fair play and substantial justice test may “serve to establish the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required”).  
This issue also highlights the underlying theme in this Comment that a personal jurisdiction 
analysis can never be a rigidly applicable test, but, rather, it must be an evolving constitutional 
standard that adapts to a changing society.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 
(1945); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) (finding that the 
interpretation of the Constitution must be adaptable to the times in order for it to truly be a living 
document—“[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”). 
 18. 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 19. 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985). 
 20. 901 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 21. 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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unpredictable nature of the appellate courts’ analyses in determining the issue 
of personal jurisdiction in migrant worker cases.  Part V discusses the legal 
justifications for allowing Congress to enact nationwide service of process 
statutes.22  The Court has yet to determine the constitutionality of serving 
process on a nationwide basis since its decision in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.23  If Congress amends the AWPA to allow for such a form of 
service of process, it must do so constitutionally.  Part VI will analyze migrant 
workers’ socio-economic conditions and suggest the reasons why Congress 
must amend the AWPA to include service of process on a nationwide basis.  
This Part will place a special emphasis on migrant workers’ poverty and their 
lack of education.  Furthermore, it will analyze the problems migrant workers 
face in finding legal counsel to assist them in their claims, giving additional 
support for Congress to remedy the procedural problem that migrant workers 
face.  Finally, this Comment offers a brief conclusion regarding the need to 
help migrant workers effectively apply federal laws to their benefit.  If the 
AWPA is to benefit migrant workers to its fullest extent, the workers must be 
able to assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident farm owners via 
nationwide service of process. 
II.  THE MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT 
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the American public 
began to hear about the mistreatment that migrant agricultural laborers 
encountered from farm labor contractors.24  Common abuses included 
fraudulent transportation charges billed to the workers, underpaying workers 
for their labor, supplying workers with horrifically substandard housing, and 
 
 22. It is true that nationwide service of process and personal jurisdiction are not equivalent 
in the mathematical sense; however, “[s]ervice of process is the vehicle by which the court may 
obtain jurisdiction.”  Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d. 147, 155 (1st Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Auto. Body 
Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400, 402 (1st Cir. 1965)).  The distinction, however, is relevant when 
federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated solely upon diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 (2000).  A claim under the AWPA will involve federal question subject matter 
jurisdiction, and, therefore, this Comment will equate service of process with personal 
jurisdiction.  See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 
(11th Cir. 1997) (“When a federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, it becomes 
the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction” (citing Chase & Sanborn Corp. v. Granfinanciera, 
835 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989))); Driver, 577 F.2d at 155 n.23 (recognizing that “[t]he distinction 
[between service of process and personal jurisdiction] is most important . . . in diversity cases”); 
see also Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the 
nationwide service of process provision of a federal statute creates a valid assertion of personal 
jurisdiction in federal court). 
 23. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 24. See S. REP. NO. 88-202, at 1 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3690, 3690. 
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misrepresenting to the workers the nature and availability of work.25  Congress 
felt the need to help the struggling migrant workers by enacting the Farm 
Labor Contractor Registration Act of 196326 (“FLC”).  To understand why the 
AWPA—which replaced the FLC—exists today, the FLC must be briefly 
analyzed. 
A. The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the FLC27 was to remove the restraints on 
interstate commerce caused by the “irresponsible [labor] contractors”28 in their 
treatment of migrant workers.29  All farm labor contractors were required to 
register with the Secretary of Labor before engaging in agricultural recruitment 
work.30  In fact, if a farm owner intended to rely on a third party to recruit 
labor, the farm owner must have first made certain that the third party was 
registered with the Labor Department.31  Through this registration, 
enforcement agencies would have documentation to track labor contractors if 
mistreatment and abuse accusations from migrant workers were to arise. 
In addition to mandating registration of labor contractors, Congress also 
forced all farm labor contractors to disclose to migrant workers at the time of 
recruitment: (1) the place of employment; (2) the crops involved; (3) any 
transportation and housing that would be provided; (4) the wages offered; (5) 
the charges the labor contractor would make in offering his services 
(recruitment); (6) the length of the job; (7) the existence of any strikes at the 
place of employment; and (8) the existence of arrangements made by labor 
contractors with retail businesses in the area of employment from which the 
 
 25. See  S. REP. NO. 88-202, at 2-3, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3690, 3692. 
 26. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1982).  
The FLC is examined in W. Gary Vause, The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 11 
STETSON L. REV. 185 (1982). 
 27. Congress enacted the FLC under the Commerce Clause.  7 U.S.C. § 2041(a), repealed by 
AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872.  “Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 3. 
 28. 7 U.S.C. § 2041(b), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872.  “The term ‘farm 
labor contractor’ means any person, who, for a fee, either for himself or on behalf of another 
person, recruits, solicits, hires, furnishes, or transports migrant workers (excluding members of 
his immediate family) for agricultural employment.”  Id. § 2042(b). 
 29. See id. § 2041(b).  The FLC defined migrant workers to include: “individual[s] [that 
have] primary employment . . . in agriculture . . . or [those that] perform[] agricultural labor . . . 
on a seasonal or other temporary basis.”  Id. § 2042(g).  For a comparison of this definition of 
migrant workers with the definition under the AWPA, see infra note 45. 
 30. See 7 U.S.C. § 2043(a), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. 
 31. See id. § 2043(c). 
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contractor would receive a commission from sales made by the businesses to 
the migrant workers.32 
Violations of the FLC by the labor contractors gave migrant workers the 
right to civil damages.33  Unfortunately, the FLC was not very effective in 
preventing migrant workers from facing abuses.  Litigation in this area almost 
always centered on the FLC’s labor contractor exemption from liability 
schemes,34 and only very rarely considered the protections of the workers.35  
 
 32. See id. § 2045(b).  These obligations of the farm labor contractor are similar to those 
under the AWPA.  See AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (2000). 
 33. 7 U.S.C.§ 2048(b), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. 
 34. Under the FLC, the following were not considered farm labor contractors and, therefore, 
were not liable for violations: 
  (1) any nonprofit charitable organization, public or nonprofit private educational 
institution, or similar organization; 
  (2) any farmer, processor, canner, ginner, packing shed operator, or nurseryman who 
personally engages in any such activity for the purpose of supplying migrant workers 
solely for his own operation; 
  (3) any full-time or regular employee of any entity referred to in (1) or (2) above who 
engages in such activity solely for his employer on no more than an incidental basis; 
  (4) any person who engages in any such activity (A) solely within a twenty-five mile 
intrastate radius of his permanent place of residence and (B) for not more than thirteen 
weeks per year; 
  (5) any person who engages in any such activity for the purpose of obtaining migrant 
workers of any foreign nation for employment in the United States if the employment is 
subject to— 
(A) an agreement between the United States and such foreign nation; or 
(B) an arrangement with the government of any foreign nation under which written 
contracts for the employment of such workers are provided for and the enforcement 
thereof is provided for through the United States by an instrumentality of such foreign 
nation; 
  (6) any full-time or regular employee of any person holding a certificate of 
registration under [the FLC]; 
  (7) any common carrier or any full-time regular employee thereof engaged solely in 
the transportation of migrant workers; 
  (8) any custom combine, hay, harvesting, or sheep shearing operation, 
  (9) any custom poultry harvesting, breeding, debeaking, sexing, or health service 
operation, provided the employees of the operation are not regularly required to be away 
from their domicile other than during their normal working hours; or 
  (10) any person who would be required to register solely because the person is 
engaged in any such activity solely for the purpose of supplying full-time students or 
other persons whose principal occupation is not farmwork to detassel and rogue hybrid 
seed corn or sorghum for seed and to engage in other incidental farmwork for a period not 
to exceed four weeks in any calendar year: Provided, That such students or other persons 
are not required by the circumstances of such activity to be away from their permanent 
place of residence overnight: Provided further, That such students or other persons, if 
under 18 years of age, are not engaged in providing transportation in vehicles caused to be 
operated by the contractor. 
7 U.S.C. § 2042(b) (1976 & Supp. II 1979), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. 
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Many statutory exemptions allowed “possible labor contractors” to escape any 
sort of punishment under the FLC, and, therefore, they had free reign to 
mistreat migrant workers and abuse their rights.  As enforcement agencies 
became more preoccupied with technical legal disputes than with seeing that 
migrant workers were treated fairly, farm workers rightly envisioned little hope 
in securing their federal rights under the FLC.36  Congress took note of the fact 
that migrant workers’ conditions had not improved and responded again by 
repealing the FLC and enacting the AWPA.37 
B. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
The AWPA overhauled the federal regulatory protection scheme for 
migrant workers.38  The most important change was that worker protection 
requirements were enforced regardless of whether the defendant was a labor 
contractor or a farm employer.39  In fact, the AWPA was the first federal labor 
statute designed exclusively to regulate the employee-employer relationship in 
the agricultural industry.40  It is clear, therefore, that Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the AWPA was to allow the migrant worker greater legal leverage 
 
 35. See, e.g., Donovan v. Heringer Ranches, Inc., 650 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. 
Silver Creek Packing Co., 615 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1980); DeLeon v. Ramirez, 465 F. Supp. 698 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Usery v. Golden Gem Growers, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 857 (M.D. Fla. 1976).  
Congress noted that case law regarding litigation of the FLC, concerning the labor contractor 
obligations, involved “exclusion from coverage” provisions.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 2 
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4548. 
 36. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 2-3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4548-49 
(noting that the FLC and its 1974 amendments were futile in preventing abuses of migrant 
workers). 
 37. Congress heard testimony, during the legislative sessions regarding the enactment of the 
AWPA, to the effect that the FLC was “largely ignored and not adequately enforced.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-885, at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4548.  For the definitional difference 
between a migrant and seasonal worker, see infra note 45. 
 38. For protections regarding the migrant worker, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1823 (2000).  For 
protections regarding seasonal workers, see id. §§ 1831-1832. 
 39. Under the AWPA, an agricultural employer may be liable to the farm workers for 
statutory violations.  Id. § 1854(a).  The AWPA defines an agricultural employer as “[a]ny person 
who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, gin, packing shed or 
nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, 
furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker.”  Id. § 1802(2).  Thus, the 
AWPA is broader than the FLC, which allowed suits to be brought against only the labor 
contractor.  See, e.g., Flores v. Ignacio, No. 78 Civ. 5017, 1981 WL 2283, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
15, 1981) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6441) (noting that 
Congress was explicit in differentiating labor contractors from farm owners); Marshall v. 
Heringer Ranches, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (same); Salinas v. Amalgamated 
Sugar Co., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D. Idaho 1972) (holding that the FLC extended only to 
actors having personal contact with laborers). 
 40. See Marion Quisenbery, A Labor Law for Agriculture: The Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers’ Protection Act, 30 S.D. L. REV. 311 (1985). 
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over the farm owner.  Furthermore, by adopting the joint-employer doctrine, 
the AWPA sharply diminished the value of the independent contractor rule that 
had been used in the past to circumvent federal protections.41  The FLC 
originally construed the definition of “employer” too narrowly, and, as such, it 
limited the prospective defendants to only the independent labor contractor.42  
By choosing to incorporate the joint-employer doctrine as a central measure of 
the AWPA, however, Congress took notice of the unique labor and 
employment co-existence between the migrant worker and the farm owner 
present in the agricultural context.  It is the farm owner’s land on which the 
migrant worker works, and the farm owner who typically pays the worker.  
Congress recognized that the farm owner was not a passive party in the abuses 
of migrant workers.  Under the AWPA, a farm labor contractor who has 
supplied a crew and the farmer on whose farm the work is being performed are 
potential joint-employers, and both may be sued by the migrant worker for 
civil violations.43 
 
 41. A federal regulation provides: 
The term joint employment means a condition in which a single individual stands in the 
relation of an employee to two or more persons at the same time. A determination of 
whether the employment is to be considered joint employment depends upon all the facts 
in the particular case. If the facts establish that two or more persons are completely 
disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee, a joint 
employment situation does not exist. 
29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2002).  Moreover, as the House Education and Labor Committee 
commented: 
[W]here an agricultural employer or association asserts that the agricultural workers in 
question are the sole employees of an independent contractor . . . [and the] labor 
contractor is found to be a bona fide independent contractor, [such] status does not as a 
matter of law negate the possibility that an agricultural employer or association may be a 
joint employer of the harvest workers and jointly responsible for the contractor’s 
employees. 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4553. 
 42. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 43. See supra note 39.  Section 1802(3) reads: “The term ‘agricultural employment’ means 
employment in any service or activity includ[ing] . . . the handling, planting, drying, packing, 
packaging, processing, freezing, or grading prior to delivery for storage of any agricultural or 
horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state.”  29 U.S.C. § 1802(3).  For the definitional 
difference between a migrant worker and a seasonal worker, see infra note 45.  For further 
information on the use of the joint-employer doctrine under the AWPA, see 29 C.F.R. § 
500.20(h)(4).  For cases concerning the issue of joint-employment see, for example, Haywood v. 
Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 584-92 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 487 
(D. N.J. 1986).  For an examination of the joint-employer doctrine in the migrant farm worker 
context, see Marc Linder, The Joint Employment Doctrine: Clarifying Joint Legislative-Judicial 
Confusion, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1989) (“The [House] Committee’s 
adoption of the ‘joint employer’ doctrine was deliberately made for it presented the best means by 
which to insure that the purposes of [the AWPA] would be fulfilled.”).  This Comment focuses on 
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1. Protections Afforded Farm Workers Under the AWPA 
The AWPA separates the protections afforded migrant workers from those 
afforded the seasonal agricultural workers.44  The main difference between a 
migrant worker and a seasonal worker is where the worker resides while 
employed on a farm.45  The migrant worker is afforded slightly more 
protection than the seasonal worker; however, this difference is irrelevant for 
purposes of this Comment, which considers only the migrant worker.46  A 
major protection granted to the migrant worker is that the farm employer must 
disclose—in writing—information relating to the job at the time the laborer is 
recruited for employment.47  This information includes: (1) where the farm 
 
suits by migrant workers against the non-resident farm owner and does not attempt to cover 
causes of actions against the labor contractors. 
 44. See supra note 38; see infra note 46. 
 45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1808(8)(A), (10)(A).  “[T]he term ‘migrant agricultural worker’ means 
an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary 
nature, and who is required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of residence.”  Id. § 
1802(8)(A).  Exempt from the status of migrant workers are “any immediate family member[s] of 
an agricultural employer or a farm labor contractor.”  Id. § 1802(8)(B)(i).  Further exemptions 
apply to “any temporary nonimmigrant alien who is authorized to work in agricultural 
employment in the United States.”  Id. § 1802(8)(B)(ii).  In contrast, “the term ‘seasonal 
agricultural worker’ means an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a 
seasonal or other temporary nature and is not required to be absent overnight from his permanent 
place of residence.”  Id. § 1802(10)(A).  The same exemptions that apply to the definition of 
migrant workers also apply to seasonal workers.  Id. § 1802(10)(B)(i)-(iii).  This Comment is 
concerned with only the migrant agricultural worker.  In fact, the issue of lack of personal 
jurisdiction over a farm owner would rarely be an issue in a suit initiated by a seasonal 
agricultural worker because the seasonal worker would most likely reside in the same forum as 
the defendant farm owner.  Furthermore, for a comparison of the definition of migrant workers 
under the AWPA with that of the definition under the FLC, see supra note 29. 
 46. Section 1821(c) requires that farm employers post housing conditions offered to the 
migrant workers.  29 U.S.C. § 1821(c).  This provision is not included in the seasonal worker 
protection provisions.  See id. § 1831.  This is because the seasonal worker does not reside at the 
farm.  See id. § 1802(10)(A). 
 47. See id. § 1821(a); see also Sanchez-Calderon v. Moorhouse Farms, 995 F. Supp. 1098, 
1105 (D. Or. 1997) (holding the AWPA requires that farm owners provide workers with accurate 
information relating to employment terms, and does not only apply to future terms, conditions, 
and existence of employment); H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4562 (noting that a farm owner’s responsibility to provide information 
begins at recruitment and continues until records are no longer needed).  Under 29 U.S.C. § 
1821(d)(1), the records must be kept for at least three years.  These informational requirements 
are great protections because they provide migrant workers with knowledge of their rights so that 
they are aware when such rights are being violated.  This Comment, however, is not concerned 
with the actual substantive rights afforded to migrant workers, but rather is only concerned with 
the procedural problems of asserting these rights in courts of law.  To be complete, the AWPA 
does offer additional protections to the migrant workers.  Farm owners are required to meet 
statutory criteria in paying migrant workers their wages earned.  Id. § 1822(a)-(c) (stating 
protections for migrant agricultural workers).  This section provides, as follows: 
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work is to take place;48 (2) the wage that the migrant worker will be paid;49 (3) 
what type of work the migrant worker will be involved in;50 (4) the length of 
time that the migrant worker will be required to work on the farm;51 (5) what 
benefits other than wages the workers will receive;52 (6) whether the migrant 
workers are being recruited to work at a farm that is currently witnessing a 
strike;53 (7) “the existence of any arrangements with any owner or agent of any 
establishment in the area of employment under which the [farm employer] is to 
receive a commission or any other benefit resulting from any sales by such 
establishment to the workers”;54 and (8) information relating to insurance 
policies available for the workers.55  Because of the joint-employer doctrine, 
the farm owner must transmit this information, which is a major change from 
the FLC.  These written disclosures given to the migrant worker provide 
support in litigation arising from later violations concerning the terms of the 
work agreement.  The protections also give migrant workers a fair chance to 
determine whether employment will best suit their needs, and it does not leave 
the migrant workers at the mercy of finding out the nature of their jobs when 
they are hundreds of miles from their homes. 
Another provision of the AWPA requires farm owners to place, in a 
conspicuous location, a poster outlining the rights and protections offered to 
the farm workers.56  Such posters must explicitly inform the workers of their 
 
Wages, supplies, and other working arrangements 
(a) Payment of wages 
  Each farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, and agricultural association which 
employs any migrant agricultural worker shall pay the wages owed to such worker when 
due. 
(b) Purchase of goods or services by worker 
  No farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association shall 
require any migrant agricultural worker to purchase any goods or services solely from 
such farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association. 
(c) Violation of terms of working arrangement 
  No farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association shall, 
without justification, violate the terms of any working arrangement made by that 
contractor, employer, or association with any migrant agricultural worker. 
Id.  Also, migrant workers must be provided housing—if such housing is offered—that complies 
with safety and health measures.  Id. § 1823(a)–(c). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2000). 
 49. Id. § 1821(a)(2). 
 50. Id. § 1821(a)(3). 
 51. Id. § 1821(a)(4). 
 52. Id. § 1821(a)(5). 
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6). 
 54. Id. § 1821(a)(7). 
 55. Id. § 1821(a)(8). 
 56. Id. § 1821(b).  The Labor Secretary has the responsibility to provide these posters to the 
farm employers.  29 C.F.R. § 500.75(c) (2002).  The posters must be displayed during the full 
course of employment.  Id. § 500.75(g) (“If the terms and conditions of occupancy are disclosed 
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rights to request the statutorily mandated information from the employer.57  
Furthermore, the AWPA requires the farm owner to place, in a conspicuous 
area, a poster regarding the housing terms and conditions offered to the 
workers, if such offers are made and accepted.58  Moreover, the farm owner is 
responsible for preserving records relating to the amount of wages paid to the 
workers, the number of hours worked by the migrants, and the net payments 
that the migrant workers receive.59  The farm owner has a duty to provide 
workers with a written statement that itemizes the required information for 
each pay period.60  This itemization requirement is another tool that the 
workers will find useful if disputes as to proper pay or hours worked arise 
during or after the course of the migrant laborers’ employment.  Finally, all of 
the information that the employer is required to give must be in writing and “in 
English or, as necessary and reasonable, in Spanish or other language common 
to migrant agricultural workers who are not fluent or literate in English.”61 
2. Private Right of Action Under the AWPA62 
Because the AWPA holds farm owners—not simply the labor contractor—
responsible for statutory violations, it provides for more expansive use by 
migrant workers than the FLC allowed, with the result being that the AWPA is 
better able to remedy violations.63  Although the AWPA addressed the limited 
scope of the FLC,64 it is only effective to private rights of actions if it can be 
properly employed in the judicial system.  In other words, to ensure the 
effectiveness of the AWPA, migrant workers must be able to assert personal 
jurisdiction over the non-resident farm owner. 
 
to the worker through a statement (rather than through a posting), such statement shall be 
provided to the worker prior to occupancy.”). 
 57. See 29 U.S.C. § 1821(b).  The information that must be disclosed to the migrant workers, 
if they request such information, is that listed under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a).  See supra notes 48-55 
and accompanying text. 
 58. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(c). 
 59. Id. § 1821(d)(1). 
 60. Id. § 1821(d)(2).  Such information relating to the pay period that must be itemized is 
enumerated in the AWPA.  See id. § 1821(d)(1).  Moreover, the AWPA requires that wages are to 
be paid to the worker at the time they are due.  Id. § 1822(a); 29 C.F.R. § 500.81 (2002) (the farm 
owner must pay the worker at least semi-monthly). 
 61. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(g). 
 62. The AWPA provides for criminal and administrative penalties as well.  See id. §§ 1851, 
1853.  A farm owner that “willfully and knowingly” refuses to abide by the provisions of the 
AWPA may be fined up to $1,000, or imprisoned up to one year, or both.  Id. § 1851(a).  
Subsequent violations of the AWPA may result in a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to 
three years in jail, or both.  Id.  Anyone violating the provisions of the AWPA may also be civilly 
penalized an amount up to $1,000 per violation.  Id. § 1853(a)(1). 
 63. See 7 U.S.C. § 2048(a)-(c) (1976), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1982). 
 64. See Linder, supra note 43, at 321-22. 
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As for a private right of action, the AWPA allows aggrieved parties to file 
suit in any district court having subject matter jurisdiction.65  Although the 
AWPA is federal legislation, compliance with supplemental state law is still 
mandated by the statute, and no individual may be excused from complying 
with such state laws.66  A claim under the AWPA will be successful against a 
farm employer if the court finds that the employer intentionally violated the 
provisions of the statute.67  The plaintiff migrant worker may receive damages, 
including actual damages, and statutory damages not exceeding “$500 per 
plaintiff per violation,” or other fair remedies.68  In determining damages, the 
court may take notice of whether or not the parties to the case attempted to 
settle their disputes prior to filing suit.69  The total amount awarded to the 
aggrieved party must, as a policy objective, be enough to encourage workers to 
assert their rights by litigating violations of the AWPA.70 
Where a migrant worker has coverage under a state worker’s compensation 
plan, however, the worker’s compensation scheme is the sole remedy that the 
migrant worker may obtain if he dies or suffers bodily harm on the job.71  
Finally, Congress has provided that the statute of limitations for bringing a 
private right of action under the AWPA is tolled for the period during which 
the state worker’s compensation claim is pending.72 
The AWPA clearly evinces Congress’s intent to strengthen migrant 
workers’ rights, but it does not have its full intended effect because the AWPA 
does not allow personal jurisdiction to be asserted through nationwide service 
of process.  Under the AWPA, lawsuits may be filed only in district courts that 
have jurisdiction over the parties.73  Thus, migrant workers with legitimate 
claims under the AWPA will often find themselves at the steps of closed 
courtroom doors if personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted over the defendant 
farm owner. 
 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (2000).  The AWPA does not require that the aggrieved party 
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a federal suit.  Id. 
 66. Id. § 1871. 
 67. Id. § 1854(c)(1). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 1854(c)(2). 
 70. Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(applying policy objective to FLC). 
 71. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(d)(1). 
 72. Id. § 1854(f). 
 73. Id. § 1854(a). 
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III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE74 
The current personal jurisdiction analysis is nearly sixty years old.  The 
history of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases displays the extent to which 
the Court has left that doctrine in confusion.  Section A details the historical 
progression of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, while Section B 
discusses some of the problems with applying the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
doctrine. 
A. Historical Analysis of the Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Cases 
The issue of the constitutionality of a forum state’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.75  The Due Process Clause disallows a state from “mak[ing] 
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant 
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”76  International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington77 is the seminal case laying the foundation of the modern 
personal jurisdiction inquiry.  In International Shoe, the Supreme Court took a 
major turn from its prior personal jurisdiction doctrine by abrogating the rigid 
rule that required a defendant to be physically present within the territorial 
 
 74. This section deals only with the issue of specific personal jurisdiction and not general 
personal jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court has defined general personal jurisdiction as “[w]hen a 
State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984).  In contrast, the Court has defined specific personal jurisdiction as 
“when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”  Id. at 414 n.8.  In the hypothetical problem underlying 
this Comment, supra Part I, general jurisdiction rarely will be asserted over the defendant because 
the defendant is almost always unattached from the forum state apart from the contacts related to 
the cause of action.  In fact, in no case regarding personal jurisdiction in the migrant farm worker 
context did a court determine whether general jurisdiction was applicable.  See, e.g., Ochoa v. 
J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002); Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201 
(5th Cir. 1992); Chery v. Bowman, 901 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1990); Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk 
Train, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 590 (W.D. Tex. 2002); Villalobos v. N.C. Grower’s Ass’n, Inc., 42 F. 
Supp. 2d 131 (D.P.R. 1999); Astorga v. Connleaf, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Or. 
Harvesting, Inc. v. Villarreal, No. 91-215-DA, 1991 WL 575856 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 1991); 
Moncevoir Hyppolite v. Gorday, No. 89-1843-CIV-NESBITT, 1990 WL 80684 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
22, 1990); Lopez-Rivas v. Donovan, 629 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1986) (holding personal 
jurisdiction issue moot for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc., 476 
N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985); de la Cerda v. Hutchinson, No. 93-1743, 1994 WL 255873 (Tex. 
County. Ct. Mar. 8, 1994); Orchard Mgmt. Co. v. Soto, 463 S.E.2d 839 (Va. 1995); Surrillo v. 
Drilake Farms, Inc., 411 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1991). 
 75. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945).  See supra notes 14, 17. 
 76. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 77. Id. at 310. 
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boundaries of the forum state before it could assert in personam jurisdiction.78  
The Court concluded that the “terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ [were] used 
merely to symbolize those activities of [a] corporation’s agent within the state 
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due 
process.”79  The Court found that the activities of a non-resident defendant that 
have been “continuous and systematic” as well as that “give rise to the 
liabilities sued on,” as opposed to “conduct of a single or isolated items of 
activities in a state” not connected to the cause of action, will yield a 
constitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction, regardless of the physical 
presence of the defendant.80  According to the Court, “the boundary line 
between those activities which justify the subjection of a [defendant] to suit, 
and those which do not, cannot be . . . mechanical or quantitative.”81  The Due 
Process Clause would not be offended if the non-resident defendant has 
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”82  
The personal jurisdiction doctrine announced by the Court allowed for a 
flexible, but vague, constitutional standard.83 
In 1957, the Supreme Court reevaluated the personal jurisdiction doctrine 
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.84  The Court in McGee noted the 
continuing expansion of the reach of a state’s long-arm statute.85  The Court 
 
 78. See id. at 317.  The Supreme Court broadened the territorial boundary test laid down in 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1877).  Such an analysis by the Court, in leaving the rigid test 
of Pennoyer and choosing to allow a flexible standard of minimum contacts, is a prime example 
of the notion that personal jurisdiction is a constitutional doctrine that has adapted to the changing 
times.  See Joelle Lee A. Nicol, Note, Given an Opportunity to Redefine the  Gray Area of 
“Minimum Contacts,” the Court in Prince v. Urban Chose to Remain in the Dark, 25 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 313, 316 (1998) (stating that “[s]ociety had become much more mobile since the Pennoyer 
decision” and thus the Court found a basis to re-adjust its personal jurisdiction analysis). 
 79. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. 
 80. Id. at 317. 
 81. Id. at 319. 
 82. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 83. See id. at 323 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority for 
“engag[ing] in an unnecessary discussion . . . which . . . has announced [a] vague Constitutional 
criteria”).  Justice Black argued that by announcing a “minimum contacts” standard for personal 
jurisdiction, the Court had “depriv[ed] a State’s citizens of due process by taking from the State 
the power to protect them . . . .”  Id. 
 84. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).  In McGee, the petitioner had 
recovered a judgment against the International Life Insurance Co. in California, and the petitioner 
then attempted to enforce such judgment in a Texas state court under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.  Id. at 221.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution states: “Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to . . . every other State.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 85. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222 (finding historical development of personal jurisdiction doctrine 
as displaying “a trend [that] is clearly discernable toward expanding the permissible scope of state 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents”).  For a treatment on the need for 
evolution in the determination of minimum contacts, see Nicol, supra note 78. 
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found that such an expansion of the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction 
was “attributable to the fundamental transformation of [the] national 
economy.”86  In a functionalist opinion, the Court concluded that “[i]t is 
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract 
which had [a] substantial connection with [the forum].”87  The majority 
carefully considered the fact that if such an allowance of personal jurisdiction 
were not satisfied in the case, the petitioner and others in similar positions 
would be “at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the 
[defendant] to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.”88  In 
essence, by expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction, the Court ensured the 
result that the non-resident defendant would not be shielded from judgment 
whenever bringing suit in the defendant’s forum would be cost-prohibitive to 
the plaintiff.89 
 
  Notwithstanding the many disparate approaches that the courts use to determine the 
existence or absence of personal jurisdiction, one common theme emerges: the facts of a 
given case cannot be analyzed in a vacuum but must instead be examined against a 
backdrop of changing societal and technological mores.  Thus the concept of personal 
jurisdiction is not static; rather it is a construct whose dynamics are continually evolving 
in response to ever changing stimuli. 
  Any court not recognizing or responding to the imperatively evolutionary nature of 
the personal jurisdiction concept runs the risk of applying outdated standards and 
imposing injustice. 
Id. at 313. 
Along similar lines of expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction were the proposals to allow 
nationwide jurisdiction in personam in federal question cases.  See Robert C. Casad, Personal 
Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX L. REV. 1589, 1620 (1992) (concluding that in 
federal question cases, “state courts can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate state 
causes of action over alien defendants who have minimum contacts with the United States as a 
whole,” and further that “Congress may . . . have the power under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enact measures eliminating the necessity for the International Shoe inquiry [of 
minimum contacts] in all cases”).  Moreover, a state’s long-arm statute is a means by which the 
forum court may assert personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.  Although the state 
may enumerate the manner in which a non-resident may be subject to suit in the state, the long-
arm statute must be in constitutional harmony with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, as interpreted by the Court.  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 639 n.14 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., plurality). 
 86. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222. 
 87. Id. at 223.  A functionalist opinion is a decision that is based on the “spirit” that the law 
espouses and is readily adapted to a changing society.  See Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing 
Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 
S. CAL. L. REV. 581, 582 (1992). 
 88. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
 89. Id. 
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One year after McGee, the Court returned to molding the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine in Hanson v. Denckla.90  In Hanson, the Supreme Court 
held that Florida could not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over a 
Delaware trust company.91  In reaching its conclusion, the Court furthered the 
due process analysis by adding two standards to the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine: (1) “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship 
with a nonresident defendant cannot” be considered a minimum contact 
necessary for personal jurisdiction; and (2) “it is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.”92  In this sense, the Court narrowed the 
acceptable reach of a state’s long-arm statute over non-resident defendants.93  
If a case were to allow for the exercise of personal jurisdiction without a 
finding of these additional criteria, the non-resident defendant would be subject 
“to litigation in a distant forum, the selection over which the nonresident had 
no control.”94 
In 1980, the Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
redefined its personal jurisdiction doctrine by addressing the concept of 
foreseeability.95  The Court severely limited the use of the mere foreseeability 
of a chattel entering the territorial boundaries of the forum as a conclusive 
basis for minimum contacts for fear that “[e]very seller of chattels would in 
effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process.”96  Such a notion 
 
 90. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  In Hanson, a settlor of a trust from Pennsylvania had appointed a 
trust company from Delaware to be the trustee of assets from such trust established in 
Pennsylvania.  Id. at 238.  The trust settlor then moved from Pennsylvania to Florida and 
executed a power of appointment over her trust.  Id. at 239.  Following the death of the trust 
settlor, the executrix of the trust attempted to obtain a judgment over the trust company in a 
Florida state court.  Id. at 239-41. 
 91. Id. at 256. 
 92. Id. at 253.  See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (holding that the 
unilateral act of a plaintiff, in moving from New York to California and then enforcing judgment 
over her divorced husband who was a resident of New York, after defendant ex-husband sent 
their child to live with the plaintiff mother in California, did not give a California court personal 
jurisdiction over defendant ex-husband because he did not purposefully avail himself of the 
benefits and protections of California laws). 
 93. The Court narrowed the sense of “minimum contacts” again by restricting such 
determinative contacts to the relationship between “the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”  
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (discussing a quasi-in rem proceeding).  The Shaffer 
Court also noted the underlying theme of the personal jurisdiction doctrine as that of being an 
adaptable and flexible standard.  See id. at 212 (concluding that the Due Process Clause “can 
be . . . readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified”). 
 94. Nicol, supra note 78, at 319. 
 95. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 96. Id. at 296. 
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would offend due process.97  Furthermore, the Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is not offended if the non-resident 
defendant “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”98 
Although the Court was secure in applying a minimum contacts analysis to 
find that personal jurisdiction over the defendants would offend due process, 
the Court noted in dicta that personal jurisdiction centers on the 
reasonableness of a forum state’s assertion of power over the defendant.  The 
Court maintained that the defendant’s burden from litigating in a distant forum 
was of primary interest in determining whether personal jurisdiction would be 
valid.  The Court also stated that the reasonableness of asserting personal 
jurisdiction should include: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute”; (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief”; (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies”; and (4) “the shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”99  The Court 
found that minimum contacts is not the sole criteria upon which personal 
jurisdiction would be decided. Rather, specific contexts may call for finding 
personal jurisdiction when the weight of the reasonableness factors is 
sufficiently heavy to find in favor of such power.  In evaluating the 
constitutionality of a forum state’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a 
non-resident defendant, the inquiry is whether the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum and litigation should have led him to “reasonably [have] 
anticipate[d] being haled into court” in the distant forum.100 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz101 was the Court’s next major case 
regarding the reasonableness inquiry of asserting personal jurisdiction.  In 
finding that personal jurisdiction existed in Burger King, the Court noted that 
“an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone” cannot 
“automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home 
forum.”102  Additionally, the Court affirmed that, in appropriate cases, the 
reasonableness factors, previously stated in dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen, 
must be taken into consideration.103  According to the Court, the 
 
 97. Id. (noting that “foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”).  See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 
239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956) (criticizing the application of the forseeability method to find 
minimum contacts later rejected in World-Wide Volkswagen because its use would result in a 
“serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of commerce between the states”). 
 98. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. 
 99. Id. at 292 (citations omitted); see also supra note 17. 
 100. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 101. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 102. Id. at 478. 
 103. Id. at 477. 
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reasonableness factors would establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
even where minimum contacts seem attenuated.104  Inverting this reasoning 
indicates that a defendant with minimum contacts sufficient to have 
purposefully benefited from the laws of the forum still may not be subject to 
personal jurisdiction if, for example, the burden to litigate in a distant forum 
would be too great a hardship.  Burger King separated the issue of personal 
jurisdiction into two discrete tests—one of minimum contacts and the other of 
the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction over the non-resident—
with each having a certain level of influence over the other.105 
The last major case that the Supreme Court decided regarding the issues of 
fair play and reasonableness with respect to the personal jurisdiction doctrine 
was Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.106  Although the Court issued 
only a plurality opinion regarding the issue of minimum contacts,107 it came to 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. For an analysis this issue, see Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and 
Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal 
Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 441 (1991); see also Walter W. Heiser, A”Minimum 
Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 938 (2000) 
(criticizing the Court’s development of its personal jurisdiction test as “car[ing] more about 
constitutional theory than outcome”).  Heiser argued that the Court wishes to reach an answer 
compatible with its interpretation of the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and not to reach an answer that is equitable.  Id. 
 106. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 107. Although the Court clearly agreed on an outcome, the analysis demonstrated the 
Justices’ diverging views regarding minimum contacts.  Four Justices, led by Justice O’Connor, 
found that in cases where a product has entered a forum through a stream of commerce and 
thereby caused an injury should not lead to personal jurisdiction.  Id. at 108-116.  An assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a suit regarding that product would be 
contrary to the defendant’s Due Process guarantees unless additional conduct by the defendant 
toward the forum existed.  Id.  The O’Connor plurality determined that “[t]he placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.”  Id. at 112.  Justice O’Connor concluded that additional conduct 
on the part of a defendant such as: “designing [a] product” geared toward the state, “advertising” 
within the state, “establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum 
State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in 
the forum State” as possible examples of a defendant “purposefully direct[ing]” acts toward the 
state if the defendant was aware “that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into 
the forum State . . . .”  Id.  Justice Brennan, on the other hand, wrote for another four justice 
plurality when he stated that “[a]s long as a participant in [the stream of commerce] is aware that 
the final product is being marketed in the forum State,” such participant should reasonably 
anticipate the possibility of being sued in that forum state.  Id. at 117.  Brennan argued that 
someone who puts goods into the stream of commerce will benefit economically from the product 
being sold in the forum state.  Id. 
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a unanimous decision regarding the ultimate outcome of the case—denial of 
personal jurisdiction.108 
After applying the reasonableness factors, the Court determined the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the alien defendant company was 
unreasonable.109  The Court found the international context of the dispute to be 
a significant reason for finding personal jurisdiction unreasonable.  Forcing the 
defendant to litigate an indemnification suit so far from its home forum—
especially when the home forum is a different country—was too burdensome.  
The Court, therefore, refused to find that a constitutional assertion of personal 
jurisdiction existed.110 
B. Personal Jurisdiction Problems Today 
As it currently exists, the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine is not well-
defined.111  Deciding at what level minimum contacts are sufficiently 
established is not an easy task.  Although this Comment does not attempt to 
argue that the minimum contacts rationale should be abandoned entirely, there 
 
 108. See id. at 116 (denying personal jurisdiction based on the unreasonableness of haling a 
Japanese party into a California state court to litigate an indemnity suit against a Taiwanese party 
because of “the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and 
the forum State”).  The situation of the suit at issue in Asahi is quite intriguing.  A California 
resident sued a Taiwanese motorcycle tire tube manufacturer in a products liability suit in a 
California state court.  Id. at 105-06.  The Taiwanese company, in turn, sought indemnification 
from the manufacturer of the tube’s valve, a Japanese party.  Id. at 106.  Later, the original 
plaintiff to the suit settled his case out of court leaving two alien parties, one Taiwanese, the other 
Japanese, to litigate across an ocean in California.  Id. 
 109. Id. at 114.  See supra note 17 (discussing the Court’s unreasonableness of personal 
jurisdiction standard); see also supra text accompanying note 99. 
 110. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116.  Of particular relevance in Asahi is the concurring opinion of 
Justice Stevens.  Stevens argued that the fractured Court should not even bother to perform a 
minimum contacts analysis because the Court had already determined an assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over the Asahi Corporation to be unreasonable.  Id. at 121 (“An examination of 
minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court’s assertion of 
personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”) (Stevens, J., concurring).  Seemingly, Stevens implicitly 
stated that the minimum contacts analysis is not even applicable as a constitutional standard.  The 
Court always starts with an examination of minimum contacts and then decides the 
reasonableness factors.  See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) 
(concluding that the “constitutional touchstone [of personal jurisdiction] remains whether the 
defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum” (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).  If, however, Stevens were to argue for starting with a 
determination of reasonableness before minimum contacts, one could possibly arrive at the 
paradoxical conclusion that jurisdiction in personam would comport with fair play and substantial 
justice, but at the same time not be valid because of a lack of minimum contacts.  In this case, the 
conclusion one could draw from Justice Stevens’s reasoning is that only the reasonableness 
factors of Burger King be examined, and minimum contacts be disregarded. 
 111. For a severe criticism of the Court’s personal jurisdiction approach and a proposed 
“minimum interest” method for determining personal jurisdiction, see Heiser, supra note 105. 
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is reason to question the validity and benefits of its application.112  Even 
though the Court has asserted that the minimum contacts test is met when the 
defendant has “reasonably anticipated” being haled into court, applications of 
the personal jurisdiction doctrine are not so easily conducted.  For example, 
what does it actually mean for the cause of action to arise out of the 
defendant’s contacts?  On this issue, the Supreme Court has seemingly left the 
circuit courts in disagreement.113  This uncertainty has resulted in a 
voluminous amount of litigation concerning minimum contacts.114  
Furthermore, the issue of personal jurisdiction may be raised after the trial 
court has rendered its decision, thus draining appellate resources.  This 
indicates that judicial resources may be more efficiently utilized with a clearer 
standard guiding courts.115 
Although the current personal jurisdiction doctrine needs revision, this 
Comment does not intend to delve into the possible remedies to this situation, 
but rather focuses on the narrow issue of the necessity for nationwide service 
of process for claims brought under the AWPA.  The very fact, however, that 
the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis is vague116—and possibly 
unworkable—gives added strength to the argument that the AWPA be given a 
nationwide service of process amendment. 
 
 112. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due Process, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 477, 483 
(2001) (“Typically, new factors [to the minimum contacts test] have been added [by the Court] 
without acknowledgment or justification of departure from past practice and with little if any 
attempt to integrate innovations with prior cases.”). 
 113. See Michael J. Neuman & Assocs. v. Florabelle Flowers, Inc., 15 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 
1994) (making no reference to purposeful availment standard in personal jurisdiction analysis, but 
rather simply concluding that because defendant’s representative made periodic visits to the 
forum, jurisdiction was satisfied).  Compare Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 
F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000) (employing “but for” test), and Lanier v. Am. Bd. of 
Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that purposeful availment is met 
through the “but for” test), with Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1260 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (employing “legal or proximate cause” test), and In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van 
Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 231 (6th Cir. 1972) (finding personal jurisdiction when 
consequences in the forum were “made possible” by defendant’s contacts and actions). 
 114. Russel J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 531, 531-32, 531 n.5 (1995) (finding more than 2,000 cases litigated on the minimum 
contacts test between 1990-1995). 
 115. See Partick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried 
Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 583 (1995) (stating that “[t]he realistic chance of reversal 
generated by the confusing and unstable [personal jurisdiction] doctrine invites appeals”). 
 116. The problems in effectively using the personal jurisdiction analysis devised by the Court 
dates back to the very beginning of the minimum contacts analysis.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 323 (1945) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court has 
not chosen to [provide a workable standard], but instead has engaged in an unnecessary 
discussion [of minimum contacts] in the course of which it has announced [a] vague 
Constitutional criteri[on].”). 
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IV.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT FARM OWNER—
SUBSTANTIVE CASE LAW 
As discussed above, the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine is the source 
of a number of problems.  Several of these problems have been reflected in the 
migrant farm worker context.  This Part will analyze four appellate-level 
cases—three from the federal courts of appeals and one from New York’s 
highest court—dealing with the issue of whether personal jurisdiction may be 
asserted over the non-resident defendant farm owner.  As shown below, these 
cases often contain flaws or stretch legal theories to find personal jurisdiction.  
Alternatively, contacts are often simply too attenuated to satisfy due process.  
In either situation, these cases demonstrate that whether migrant workers can 
bring suit against farm owners will be uncertain, because of the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
A. Cases Finding Personal Jurisdiction 
1. The Ninth Circuit: Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc. 
In April 2002, the Ninth Circuit decided, in a functionalist approach, 
Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc.117  In this case, a farm owner residing 
in New York requested the help of a Texas-based labor contractor in recruiting 
migrant workers to help for the upcoming cabbage and squash harvests.118  The 
labor contractor, knowing of an existing surplus of farm workers in Arizona, 
agreed to recruit and transport migrant workers from Arizona to New York.119  
The workers were orally promised their rights under employment, including 
wage rates and housing conditions.120  The migrant workers, however, alleged 
that while working on the New York farm, the farm owner, Martin Farms, 
provided substandard housing and failed to pay wages due.121  Upon returning 
to Arizona, the migrant workers filed suit in a federal district court in Arizona 
claiming Martin Farms violated the AWPA.122  Unfortunately, the migrant 
workers found the courtroom doors closed when the district court determined 
that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over Martin Farms consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.123 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit decided the issue of personal jurisdiction 
based upon whether an agency relationship had existed between the Texas 
 
 117. 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002).  For an understanding of a functionalist opinion, see 
supra note 87. 
 118. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1186. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1187. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1186-87. 
 123. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1187. 
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labor contractor and Martin Farms.124  The court found that because the labor 
contractor had purposefully directed his activities toward the state of 
Arizona,125 personal jurisdiction could be asserted over the farm owner if an 
agency relationship existed between the labor contractor and Martin Farms.  
This was a form of vicarious personal jurisdiction.126  Ultimately, the court 
held that the labor contractor was an agent—not an independent contractor—of 
Martin Farms, and that the activities of the agent could count as minimum 
contacts sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over the principal Martin 
Farms.127 
In deciding that an agency relationship existed between the farm owner 
and labor contractor, the court stretched to satisfy the requirements for finding 
agency.  For example, the court considered eight factors to determine whether 
an agency relationship existed under Arizona law.128  Those factors included: 
(1) the farm employer’s level of control over the labor contractor; (2) the 
“distinct nature” of the labor contractor’s business; (3) the particular skills and 
specialization of the labor contractor; (4) the materials and work location 
involved; (5) the length of time the labor contractor was employed by the farm 
owner; (6) the method with which the farm employer paid the labor contractor; 
(7) “the relationship of work done to the regular business of the employer”; 
and (8) the belief of the farm owner and the labor contractor as to whether an 
agency relationship actually existed.129  The Court found that Martin Farm’s 
ability to exercise control over the labor contractor, the labor contractor’s lack 
of specialization and skills, and the relationship of the work to the regular 
business of Martin Farms all pointed in the direction of an agency 
relationship.130 
Upon closer examination, one will note that the balance between those 
factors tending to prove an agency relationship and those tending to prove that 
the labor contractor was an independent contractor was fairly even—until the 
court considered the fourth (the materials and place of work)131 and first 
(Martin Farms’ level of control over the labor contractor)132 factors.  As for the 
fourth factor, the court noted that because Martin Farms supplied tools for the 
migrant farm workers and controlled the migrant workers’ work area, an 
 
 124. Id. at 1189-92. 
 125. Id. at 1189. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1192. 
 128. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1190-92. 
 129. See id. at 1189; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). 
 130. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1189-91. 
 131. Id. at 1191. 
 132. Id. at 1190. 
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agency relationship likely existed between it and the labor contractor.133  This 
proposition, however, establishes a relationship between the farm owner and 
the migrant workers.  The labor contractor is not even considered in this factor, 
yet the court still uses it to find that an agency relationship existed between the 
farm owner and the labor contractor.  This inconsistency may be explained by 
recognizing that were the court to find no agency, it would have necessarily 
resulted in affirmation of the district court’s decision—a result the court likely 
believed to be inequitable.  The court focused the reasonableness standard of 
personal jurisdiction on the fact that the migrant workers were “of very limited 
means,” citing national statistics regarding the poverty levels of migrant 
workers to support the fact that jurisdiction was reasonable.134  It is unclear, 
however, why national statistics of migrant workers should impact the 
reasonableness test of Burger King; after all, they do not directly concern the 
parties involved.135 
As for the first factor—Martin Farms’ level of control over the labor 
contractor—the court stated explicitly, “Martin Farms exercised very little day-
to-day control over [the labor contractor’s] recruitment and management of 
the . . . migrant workers.”136  Nevertheless, the court decided that Martin Farms 
had the ability to give instructions to the labor contractor and expect that such 
instructions be carried out.137  The court explicitly concluded that little control 
over the labor contractor existed, yet it still maintained that this factor 
contributed to an agency relationship. 
The court was clearly persuaded to find jurisdiction consistent with due 
process in this case because of the extreme hardship and problems—in light of 
their financial conditions—that the migrant workers would face litigating their 
claim in New York.  In finding personal jurisdiction based upon the minimum 
 
 133. Id. at 1191.  Finding an agency relationship based on the fourth factor—the materials 
and work location involved—is quite a stretch because it is the labor contractor that must be 
supplied tools and designated a controlled work area, not the migrant worker, for a finding of 
agency with the labor contractor to exist.  One possibility is that the court was simply 
sympathetic to the plight of the migrant workers and therefore stretched the rules of law to “open 
the courtroom doors” to hear their claim. 
 134. Id. at 1192 & n.6 (citing that only 10% of migrants are provided vacation benefits and 
over 60% live in poverty).  For a more in-depth analysis of the socio-economic conditions of 
migrant workers, see infra Part VI.A-C. 
 135. See supra note 17.  The reasonableness factors in determining personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant are directed toward the defendant involved in the litigation, and not to a 
hypothetical defendant as portrayed through national statistics.  See Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (“Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately 
result from actions by the defendant himself  . . . with the forum State.”). 
 136. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1190. 
 137. Id. 
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contacts standards of the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit manipulated the 
determination of the agency relationship to help the workers.138 
A minimum contacts analysis conducted by the Supreme Court would 
clearly point to the fact that the farm employer did not himself benefit from the 
protections of Arizona’s laws.  He benefited only vicariously through the labor 
contractor; however, the Ninth Circuit’s manipulation of the first and fourth 
factors obscures whether such a form of vicarious personal jurisdiction even 
existed through the Ochoa agency analysis.  The problem that results from 
such an analysis is that determining whether personal jurisdiction will exist in 
the migrant worker cases becomes much too unpredictable. 
2. The Court of Appeals of New York: Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc. 
In 1985, the highest court of New York dealt with the issue of personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident farm employer in Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc. 
(Rios II).139  Rios II involved migrant workers in Puerto Rico trying to enforce 
Puerto Rican default judgments against New York apple growers in the forum 
of New York.140  The defendants in this case delivered clearance order forms 
(that is, job offers) to the Department of Labor’s Interstate Clearance System, 
requesting farm labor help.141  The Labor Department, in turn, distributed the 
defendant’s job offers to various forum states as well as Puerto Rico.142  At no 
time did the New York defendants request that Puerto Ricans be hired for 
employment, and at no time before employment did the New York defendants 
have any contact with the Puerto Rican migrant workers.143  The defendants 
were contacted by the Labor Department regarding the Puerto Rican workers’ 
acceptance of employment, and the migrant workers began work on the New 
 
 138. Such a construction of the agency analysis is commendable for its recognition of the 
need to protect the low-income migrant workers.  The price paid, however, is straying from the 
law—the defendant’s due process guarantees.  One must remember Chief Justice Marshall’s 
powerful statement that “there must be [a] rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803).  Although Marbury 
concerned an issue of proper subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, as opposed to personal 
jurisdiction, the need for the “rule of law” should be equally applicable in all legal contexts. 
 139. 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985) (hereinafter Rios II). 
 140. Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), rev’d, 476 
N.E.2d 312.  The Court of Appeals of New York adopted the dissenting opinion from the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division’s case as its official opinion.  Rios II, 476 N.E.2d at 
312.  For the sake of clarity, this Comment labels the opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of 
New York as Rios II, and it labels Justice Levine’s dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division’s case as Rios.  The facts of Rios II were taken directly by the Court of 
Appeals from Rios.  See id. 
 141. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 521.  The Interstate Clearance System is the mechanism that farm 
employers must engage in when they wish to hire alien workers.  For an understanding of the use 
of this mechanism, see infra note 165. 
 142. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 522. 
 143. Id. 
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York farms.144  Problems, however, between the workers and the employers 
ensued, and the plaintiffs left New York to return home.145 
Following the termination of their employment, the migrant workers filed 
suit against the defendants in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, where the 
court granted default judgment.146  The migrant workers then attempted to 
enforce the judgment in the courts of New York, but the defendants argued that 
the Puerto Rican forum did not originally have personal jurisdiction over 
them.147  The Supreme Court of New York held that personal jurisdiction 
existed, but the Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed the trial court.  
Adopting the dissenting opinion of Justice Levine,148 the Court of Appeals of 
New York reversed, finding that the defendants had indeed established 
minimum contacts in Puerto Rico, and an assertion of personal jurisdiction 
would comport with fair play.149 
In concluding that a constitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
the New York defendants existed in Puerto Rico, Justice Levine relied heavily 
on the fact that the defendants “were made aware that the job orders were 
physically delivered to Puerto Rican employment offices . . . well before the 
date [of employment] was to commence.”150  Levine found that the defendants 
had received information regarding not only the number and names of workers 
that were to report to work in New York, but also health records and other 
administrative information submitted during the application process.151  Upon 
examining the totality of circumstances, Levine concluded that the defendants 
had, in fact, established minimum contacts with Puerto Rico.152  He declared 
that the defendants had “purposefully sent [the clearance orders] into the 
stream of interstate commerce,”153 and were fully aware that the clearance 
orders could have the potential of being acted upon in Puerto Rico.  Thus, the 
defendants were believed to have “deliberately set in motion the job 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. The plaintiff’s allegations were that the defendants breached their contract and 
committed torts.  Id.  The causes of action were not based upon violations of the AWPA because 
the AWPA had not yet been enacted.  This is of little consequence, however, since this Comment 
is concerned not with the substantive law of the AWPA, but rather with the procedural aspects of 
asserting the AWPA in court. 
 146. Id.  The migrant workers alleged that the defendant farm owner had violated the 
Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.  Id. at 521. 
 147. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 522. 
 148. Rios II, 476 N.E.2d at 312 (reversing the order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division 
“for [the] reasons stated in the dissenting opinion by Justice Howard A. Levine”). 
 149. Rios, N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Levine, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 525. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 526. 
 153. Id. at 526. 
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recruitment machinery of the interstate clearance system.”154  From this stream 
of commerce rationale, the minimum contacts between the forum, the 
litigation, and the defendant were established. 
As for the reasonableness inquiry of personal jurisdiction, Justice Levine 
was heavily influenced by the burden that the Puerto Rican plaintiffs would 
encounter litigating their claim in New York.155  After comparing the relative 
burdens that the migrant workers and the defendant employers would face in 
litigating in New York and Puerto Rico, respectively, Levine concluded: 
[F]air play and justice demand that plaintiffs be permitted validly to litigate 
their claims in their home forum.  Plaintiffs here are impoverished, English-
illiterate farm workers.  Economic and logistical realities render them totally 
incapable of obtaining legal redress for their complaints in the courts of New 
York.  Defendants, on the other hand, are ongoing business entities.  They 
have already demonstrated their willingness to act collectively and share the 
costs of litigation in the Federal courts, as well as in the New York courts in 
the matter now before us.  It may reasonably be assumed that the common 
defense to all of the claims asserted by these plaintiffs would basically entail 
testimony from a few supervisory employees concerning defendants’ 
justification for discharging plaintiffs.  Imposing the burden of producing such 
witnesses in Puerto Rico hardly amounts to a denial of due process, when a 
converse ruling effectively would confer total immunity from suit upon 
defendants.156 
The economic realities facing the migrant workers would have made the 
defendants “judgment proof” had the defendants been forced to go to New 
York.157  This is because the migrant workers would not be economically 
capable of litigating an entire case so far away from home. 
In adopting the dissenting opinion of Justice Levine, the Court of Appeals 
of New York erred.  Justice Levine’s reasoning is not in accord with the 
forseeability that a chattel will enter the stream of commerce rationale laid out 
by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen.  As Justice White declared 
only five years before the decision in Rios II, “the foreseeability that is critical 
to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its 
way into the forum state.”158  The Rios II defendants merely were aware of the 
 
 154. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (Levine, J., dissenting). 
 155. See id. at 525-28. 
 156. Id. at 528. 
 157. See id.; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
 158. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).  Rios II was 
decided before the Supreme Court’s plurality split in Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior 
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  Justice Brennan opined that “[so] long as a participant in [the stream 
of commerce] is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility 
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”  Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Nevertheless, 
the weight of the cases seems to be in favor of the “stream of commerce plus” theory.  See supra 
note 107.  For cases arguing that the “mere likelihood” that a product enters the stream of 
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fact that the interstate clearance orders would enter the stream of commerce by 
the unilateral act of the Department of Labor and be carried into Puerto Rico.  
Importantly, the defendants did not “purposefully [avail themselves] of the 
privilege of conducting activities within [Puerto Rico].”159 
Additionally, Levine’s reasoning is contrary to the rationale supporting of 
the Court’s McGee decision.160  Unlike the facts in McGee, where the 
defendant was fully aware with whom it was contracting before the insurer 
accepted the insurance, the defendants in Rios II did not know who the migrant 
workers were before the offers of employment were accepted.161  Minimum 
contacts should not have been established in Levine’s dissenting opinion, and 
therefore the New York high court erred in adopting Levine’s opinion.162 
B. Cases Finding Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
1. The Eleventh Circuit: Chery v. Bowman 
In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case Chery v. 
Bowman.163  Chery involved a suit under the AWPA in a Florida federal court 
between the plaintiff migrant workers from Florida and the Virginian 
defendant farm owner Bowman.164  After deciding that he would need foreign 
agricultural workers to help on his farm, Bowman complied with the 
Department of Labor’s requirement of submitting clearance order forms to the 
Interstate Clearance System to ensure job opportunities went to U.S. migrant 
workers before foreign workers.165  The Department of Labor distributed the 
 
commerce is not enough to establish minimum contacts, see Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 
F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that non-resident defendant’s “awareness that the [injury-
causing product] might end up in [forum]” was not enough for minimum contacts); Falkirk 
Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 376 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 
“placement of a product [by defendant] into the stream of commerce, without more,” is not 
enough for minimum contacts). 
 159. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 160. McGee, 355 U.S. at 220. 
 161. See id.; Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 522, rev’d, 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985). 
 162. Levine’s reasoning, however, regarding the reasonableness of jurisdiction provides 
useful support for this Comment’s position that the AWPA should be amended to include a 
nationwide service of process statute when asserting personal jurisdiction would be reasonable.  
Justice Levine pointed out that fair play and justice “demand” that the defendant be haled into the 
migrants’ home forum, mainly due to the poor conditions of migrants, as analyzed infra Part VI.  
See Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Levine, J., dissenting), rev’d, 476 N.E.2d 312. 
 163. 901 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 164. Id. at 1053-54. 
 165. See id. at 1054.  For an understanding of how the Interstate Clearance System functions 
through the Wagner-Peyser Act, the law requiring the use of the Interstate Clearance System, see 
20 C.F.R. § 655.201 (2001).  This regulation provides that: 
An employer who anticipates a labor shortage of workers for agricultural or logging 
employment may request a temporary labor certification for temporary foreign workers by 
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clearance orders to employment offices in states where there was an excess 
supply of farm labor, including Florida.166  Thereafter, a plaintiff farm worker 
from Florida drove to Virginia seeking agricultural work.167  At a Virginia 
employment office, the plaintiff telephoned Bowman’s agent in order to set up 
possible employment for the plaintiff and his crew.168  The plaintiff told 
Bowman that his crew would be comprised of workers from Florida.169  
Although the clearance orders that Bowman filed with the Labor Department 
stated that the plaintiff would be reimbursed for travel fees, neither Bowman 
nor his agent supported the plaintiffs in their journey to Virginia.170  After only 
a few days of work, Bowman fired the workers who, in turn, filed suit in a 
Florida federal court claiming that Bowman violated the AWPA.171 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the case by stating that, although 
the AWPA creates federal rights and allows for a private right of action, the 
personal jurisdiction analysis must be conducted in accordance with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s minimum contacts test because the AWPA does not 
contain a provision for nationwide service of process.172  The court followed 
 
filing, or by having an agent file, in duplicate, a temporary labor certification application, 
signed by the employer, with a local office in the area of intended employment. 
Id. § 655.201(a)(1).  The regulation further mandates that: 
Every temporary labor certification application shall include . . . [a] copy of the job offer 
which will be used by the employer (or each employer) for the recruitment of both U.S. 
and foreign workers. The job offer for each employer shall state the number of workers 
needed by the employer, and shall be signed by the employer. 
Id. § 655.201(b)(1).  See also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 594-96 
(1982) (concluding that the purpose of the Interstate Clearance System is to give preference 
regarding jobs to domestic workers over foreign workers, to make sure that the working 
conditions of domestic workers are not affected negatively by the entering of foreign workers into 
the employment stream, and to prevent any discrimination of domestic workers in favor of the 
alien hired hands). 
 166. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1054. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1054-55. 
 170. Id. at 1055. 
 171. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1055. 
 172. Id. at 1055 & n.2.  Because no service of process provision or statute was present, the 
federal court could only exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who would be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the forum state in which the court was located.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 4(k)(1)(A) (2000) (“Service of a summons . . . is effective to establish [personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant] who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in 
the state in which the district court is located.”); Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1987) (refusing to make an inference that nationwide service of 
process might exist when Congress had not explicitly enacted such a provision).  The court in 
Chery only focused on whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction would be compatible with 
due process as interpreted by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its 
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the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction standard by concluding that 
Bowman did not establish the minimum contacts with Florida necessary to 
have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court there.”173  The only 
contact that the court found to exist between Bowman, the Florida forum, and 
the litigation was the forwarding of clearance orders by the Labor Department 
to the Florida employment office.174  The court noted that Bowman only knew 
of the fact that Florida had received the clearance orders; at no point, however, 
did he request that such orders be delivered there.175  Thus, the unilateral 
activity of the Department of Labor could not create sufficient minimum 
contacts to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.176  The court further 
noted that, even if the dispersal of clearance order forms could be considered a 
contact, the single transmission of Bowman’s orders to Florida was too 
attenuated to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.177 
The court in Chery rightly decided the issue of minimum contacts.178  
There was no showing whatsoever that Bowman had purposefully directed his 
activities toward the Florida forum.  Bowman did not benefit from any of the 
privileges and protections of the laws of Florida.  In fact, the migrant workers 
did not even accept the employment offers from Bowman in Florida; rather, 
they accepted the offers in Virginia.179  The circumstances of the job offers in 
Chery were far removed from the purposefully directed activity of the 
defendant negotiating a contract to be governed by Florida laws in Burger 
 
progeny because it was unsure as to how the Florida long-arm statute was different from the due 
process standards required by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Chery, 901 F.2d at 1055 n.2. 
 173. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1056 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1057.  See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  Because the Department 
of Labor distributed the clearance orders to Florida by itself—a unilateral activity—that contact 
with Florida could not be a minimum contact established by the defendant.  Chery, 901 F.2d at 
1056-57. 
 177. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1056-57. 
 178. In fact, trial courts that decided the issue in favor of personal jurisdiction when the 
Interstate Clearance System was involved usually found more contacts by the defendant than just 
the dispersal of the clearance forms.  See, e.g., Neizil v. Williams, 543 F. Supp. 899, 904 (M.D. 
Fla. 1982) (finding that farm employer sent clearance order to Department of Labor and 
specifically named a forum labor contractor to recruit in that forum); Garcia v. Vasquez, 524 F. 
Supp. 40, 42 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that farm employer sent clearance orders, made telephone 
calls to the employment office in the forum state, and provided workers traveling expenses 
through the employment office in the forum state).  But see Villalobos v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 
Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 131, 140 (D.P.R. 1999) (finding that farmers and association that submitted 
clearance orders “reasonably should have known recruitment was likely to take place” in a forum 
traditionally known for a surplus of migrant workers). 
 179. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1057. 
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King.180  Because minimum contacts could not be established in Chery, the 
court did not inquire as to whether an assertion of in personam jurisdiction 
would be reasonable.181 
2. The Fifth Circuit: Aviles v. Kunkle 
In 1992, the Fifth Circuit considered the issue of personal jurisdiction 
within the migrant worker context in Aviles v. Kunkle.182  In Aviles, families of 
migrant farm workers filed suit in a federal district court in Texas alleging, 
inter alia, that the record keeping requirement of the AWPA had been violated 
by their Ohio farm employers, two brothers named Kunkle and their Florida 
foreman, Felix.183  The plaintiffs alleged that several of them worked on the 
Kunkles’ farm in Ohio during the 1982 harvest and many accepted positions 
for the following year.184  In early 1983, a representative of Felix made a call 
from Florida to one of the migrant workers, who was still in Texas, informing 
her of the start date for the harvest.185  An unknown individual then wrote to 
another migrant worker on behalf of Felix requesting the worker to report to 
the Ohio farm by early summer.186  The migrant workers receiving these 
contacts from Felix’s representatives shared the information among other 
migrant workers in Texas.187  The migrant workers arrived for work in Ohio on 
time, but they were delayed from beginning the harvest because of certain crop 
failures.188  The district court in Texas found personal jurisdiction over the 
non-resident defendants on these limited contacts and held them to be 
sufficient to meet the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements.189 
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit began its discussion in Aviles 
by noting that, because the AWPA made no mention of service of process, the 
boundary of personal jurisdiction in federal court was limited to that of the 
state court where the federal court is located.190  Because the Texas long-arm 
statute allowed for personal jurisdiction to be asserted co-extensively to the 
limits allowed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court 
decided the case based upon the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction 
 
 180. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985) (finding sufficient 
contacts when the defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff that established a franchise 
relationship in Miami “governed by Florida law, and call[ed] for payment of all required fees and 
forwarding of all relevant notices to the Miami headquarters”). 
 181. See Chery, 901 F.2d at 1057. 
 182. 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 183. Id. at 203 & n.1. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 203. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 203-04. 
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doctrine.191  The court noted that the trial court had prefaced its assertion of 
personal jurisdiction on the limited findings of “the partial performance of a 
contract in Texas, the partial commission of a tort in Texas, and the 
recruitment of Texas residents in Texas for employment outside the state.”192  
The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that the migrant workers’ cause of 
action did not arise out of any of the contacts in Texas, but rather arose out of 
the activities of the parties in Ohio.  The court decided that the violation of the 
AWPA “arose out of [the migrant workers’] employment at the Kunkles’ Ohio 
farm during the 1983 . . . harvest, [and] not out of any contacts upon which the 
district court predicated its exercise of personal jurisdiction.”193  Contacts 
consisting of one telephone call and one letter that occurred with the Texas 
forum were not enough to establish that the defendants should have 
“reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” 194  in Texas because there 
was not sufficient evidence that the defendants “purposefully avail[ed] 
[themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities” within the state.195  The 
Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the trial court, and the migrant farm 
workers were barred from continuing their suit in the courts of Texas.196 
The Fifth Circuit’s determination that personal jurisdiction was lacking 
rested on its interpretation that the cause of action did not arise out of the 
contacts between the defendant, litigation, and the forum state.197  If the 
Supreme Court were to approve such a narrow interpretation of the “arises out 
of” element of specific personal jurisdiction, it is unclear whether any rights 
violated under the AWPA will ever arise out of the contacts between the non-
resident defendant and the migrant workers’ forum.  Violations of the AWPA 
will necessarily take place in the forum state of the farm owner.  Because the 
migrant workers’ rights will not be violated until they have begun work—in 
the forum of the farm owner—the farm owner never has reason to make 
employment decisions that would violate the AWPA anywhere outside of his 
own forum.  Furthermore, the reasoning in Aviles is at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in McGee.198  In that contract-based claim, a narrow reading 
of the “arises out of” element would lead to the conclusion that the refusal of 
the insurance company to pay the premium to the plaintiff arose out of the 
 
 191. Id. at 204.  See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990) (reasoning that 
the Texas long-arm statute is sufficiently broad enough that it collapses into the due process 
standard of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 192. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 204 (footnotes omitted). 
 193. Id. at 205. 
 194. See id.; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 195. See Aviles, 978 F.2d at 205; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 196. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 205. 
 197. This is one area of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis that was noted for 
its vagueness.  See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 113. 
 198. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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activities of the insurance company in its home state of Texas because the 
decision not to pay was effectuated at the office.  Such a strict interpretation, 
however, cannot be in accord with the notion of personal jurisdiction as an 
evolving standard.199  Like the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the actions of 
the defendant in McGee, the actions of the defendants in Aviles should have 
been interpreted broadly, thus fitting more closely with the evolving standard 
of personal jurisdiction. 
C. The Migrant Worker–Personal Jurisdiction Cases Are Unpredictable 
The cases analyzed in the above Section display the problems of predicting 
whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident farm owners 
will be constitutional.  When courts find personal jurisdiction to exist, their 
analyses contain flaws or stretch legal theories to reach decisions that are 
sympathetic to the plight of the migrant workers.200  In other cases, the contacts 
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation are simply too attenuated 
to conclude that minimum contacts have been established consistently with the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Because the outcomes of Ochoa and Rios II, and 
perhaps even Aviles, should have come out differently, these opinions display 
the problems that migrant workers will face in asserting personal jurisdiction 
by following the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts test—namely, being 
unsure whether a suit against the farm owner will be viable in the courts. 
As previously noted, Congress has the power to amend the AWPA in order 
to allow for migrant workers to serve process on defendant farm owners on a 
nationwide basis.  Part V details Congress’s ability in doing so. 
V.  ANALYSIS OF NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS 
Given the socio-economic conditions of migrant workers201 and the lack of 
predictability in asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident farm owners, 
amending the AWPA to allow for nationwide service of process202 when 
 
 199. See supra note 85. 
 200. See Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 520, 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) 
(Levine, J., dissenting) (asserting that “fair play and justice demand that [the migrant workers] be 
permitted validly to litigate their claims in their home forum”), rev’d, 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 
1985).  Never after International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), did the Supreme 
Court hold that personal jurisdiction existed without minimum contacts, except in the case of 
transient personal jurisdiction, as evidenced in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (holding that the “constitutional 
touchstone [of personal jurisdiction] remains whether the defendant purposefully established 
‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State” (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316)).  But see supra 
note 110. 
 201. See infra Part VI.A-C. 
 202. “Congress has provided for nationwide service of process on a number of occasions, and 
it undeniably has the power to do so . . . .”  Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A 
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jurisdiction over the defendant would be reasonable203 would strengthen 
migrant workers’ access to justice.  Section A of this Part details Congress’s 
power in enacting nationwide service of process legislation and the judicial 
interpretation of the constitutionality of such provisions.  Section B will 
discuss the reasonableness of haling a non-resident defendant to litigate in a 
foreign forum through use of nationwide service. 
A. Legal Analysis Regarding Nationwide Service of Process Statutes 
Traditionally, Congress has had broad power to extend the long-arm 
jurisdiction throughout the United States without much restriction by the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.204  This application of personal jurisdiction 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was derived in some notion 
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s bar to personal jurisdiction outside of the 
territorial boundaries of a forum.205  Under the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, the limit on a federal court’s reach on personal jurisdiction is 
at the borders of the United States.  Under this construction of the Fifth 
Amendment’s limitation of reach, Congress has the ability to grant to federal 
courts the right to assert personal jurisdiction over any defendant regardless of 
whether the defendant has any contacts with the precise state in which the 
federal court sits.  After all, the federal court will naturally be within the 
boundaries of the nation.206 
Although the Court has maintained that minimum contacts test is the test to 
determine whether a particular forum state may assert power over a non-
resident defendant, per the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has yet to 
 
Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 482 (1981).  See also AM. L. 
INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 437 
(1969); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1587-88 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].  Congress may also 
authorize worldwide service of process, see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), but 
such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 203. See supra note 17. 
 204. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that: “No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  See, 
e.g., Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 
268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838). 
 205. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1877); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 202, at 
1587-88. 
 206. The Supreme Court’s minimum contacts test has, nevertheless, played an influential role 
in such an analysis of nationwide personal jurisdiction.  Thus, federal courts have often continued 
to operate similarly to the Court’s traditional Fourteenth Amendment Due Process doctrine of 
minimum contacts by asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant only if the defendant has 
minimum contacts with the United States, instead of a particular forum state within the United 
States.  See, e.g., Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 720 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Duckworth v. Med. Electro-Therapeutics, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 822, 826 (S.D. Ga. 1991). 
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determine whether nationwide service of process statutes are constitutional 
under the Fifth Amendment since International Shoe Co. v. Washington.207  
The only direction the Court has offered in this area comes from Justice 
Stewart’s dissenting opinion in  Stafford v. Briggs.208  Stewart maintained that 
due process in the personal jurisdiction analysis requires that minimum 
contacts be present “between the defendant and the sovereign that has created 
the court.”209  He accepted the minimum contacts analysis from International 
Shoe when applied to the nationwide service of process statute in question, but 
he did not apply that analysis in the same way that the Court had previously 
interpreted due process.210  Stewart interpreted the minimum contacts test in 
Stafford to be those contacts that the defendant has in connection with the 
United States as a nationwide forum.211  The forum in this analysis, therefore, 
is not the state in which the district court sits, because Stafford was not a case 
under the Fourteenth Amendment—a restriction on the power of states.  
Rather, Stafford involved the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—a 
restriction on the federal government.  Consequently, Stewart found that when 
nationwide service of process is made on a United States resident, no Fifth 
 
 207. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  In a case involving the Clayton Act, the Court sidestepped the 
issue of whether nationwide service would be constitutional.  United States v. Scophony Corp. of 
Am., 333 U.S. 795, 804 n.13 (1948).  See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).  The service of process 
provision of the Clayton Act provides that: 
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be 
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district 
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served 
in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found. 
Id. § 22. 
 208. 444 U.S. 527, 545 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  The majority of the Court in Stafford 
held that a statute providing for nationwide service in limited situations did not apply to the cases 
that were before the Court.  See id. at 553 (discussing the petitioner’s due process claim).  The 
Court in Stafford consolidated two court cases.  Id. at 530-33.  The statute in question (Mandamus 
and Venue Act of 1962) provided that in “[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or 
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color 
of legal authority” the suit may be brought against the defendant “in any judicial district in 
which . . . a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000).  Service of “[t]he summons and complaint in such an action . . . may be 
made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.”  
Id.  Although the Court in Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 
97 (1987), discussed the issue of nationwide service of process, it did so only to conclude that 
such a form of service of process was not relevant in the case.  See id. at 106 (concluding that 
nationwide service of process cannot be found to exist implicitly because Congress is aware of 
how to authorize such a type of service of process, and therefore when it failed to do so, it was the 
intention of Congress to not allow such a means of service). 
 209. Stafford, 444 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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Amendment due process problem would exist.212  Stewart was content in 
disregarding a consideration as to the unfairness of requiring a defendant to 
litigate in an unreasonably distant forum when the Fifth Amendment was at 
play.213  According to the lone Justice that has considered the constitutionality 
of nationwide service of process statutes (albeit over twenty years ago), 
Congress has absolute power to grant federal courts the power to hale a 
defendant into the court to litigate when hearing issues dealing with federally-
created rights, so long as the nationwide minimum contacts test is met.  In any 
case, it would be fairly evident that the defendant would have established 
sufficient minimum contacts with the sovereign of the United States when the 
defendant is, in fact, located in the United States.  The issue of nationwide 
contacts would only be relevant when the defendant is an alien party, or when 
he lives overseas. 
B. Reasonableness of Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause 
Clearly, the historical notion that Congress may grant nationwide service 
of process unfettered by the constitutional limitations of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is at odds with the fifty-plus years of the Court’s 
evolving personal jurisdiction analysis.  Although Justice Stewart’s dissent in 
Stafford did not delve into a detailed analysis of why unreasonably burdening a 
defendant in traveling far from his home would not affect the constitutionality 
of personal jurisdiction, Stafford (1980) was decided before the Court headed 
in the direction of the “reasonableness” factors that it relied upon in Burger 
King (1985) and Asahi (1987).214  Thus, if the same issue was contested today, 
the inquiry would be different. 
The Fourteenth Amendment places constitutional restrictions on states 
from unreasonably burdening a defendant by forcing him to litigate in a distant 
forum.  It seems counterintuitive, therefore, to allow Congress, simply because 
it is constrained by the Fifth Amendment, to impose those very same burdens 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  Justice Stewart did consider whether a defendant being unduly burdened in litigating 
in a distant forum would still have legal recourse to remedy the problem.  See id. at 554.  Stewart 
noted that federal district courts will “look sympathetically upon a motion for a change of venue 
in any case where [the defendant] could show that he would be substantially prejudiced if the suit 
were not transferred to a more convenient forum.”  Id.  Federal district courts have this venue 
transfer power under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).  “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought.”  Id.; Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 
F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that the fairness concern is addressed by forum non 
conveniens); Hogue v. Milodon Eng’g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that 
the fairness concern is dealt with by federal venue requirements). 
 214. See supra note 17. 
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that the Fourteenth Amendment seeks to prevent.  Proposals that the Fifth 
Amendment restrict Congress in similar ways to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
restriction on a state’s right to assert personal jurisdiction have developed.215  
One federal Court of Appeals has focused on allowing the reasonableness 
standard of the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine—developed to prevent 
the defendant from an unreasonable burden of litigation—to play a key role in 
restricting the federal courts from asserting personal jurisdiction under the 
Fifth Amendment.216  Furthermore, some commentators have viewed the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process standard to be that of general fairness to the parties 
test as opposed to a “contacts test.”217 
 
 215. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note.  See also Ralph U. Whitten, The 
Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative 
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 735, 805 (1981).  In the migrant worker context, a farm employer residing and owning 
his farm in the United States will always have minimum contacts with the United States by the 
very presence of his farm production in the United States because the direct and proximate causes 
of action under the AWPA will arise out of events on that farm.  This is because the migrant 
workers are working on farms in the United States. 
 216. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945-46 
(11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the reasonableness standard under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause is included in the Fifth Amendment’s governing standard allowing for 
federal nationwide service of process); see also Lescs v. Martinsburg Police Dep’t, No. 02-5062, 
2002 WL 1998177, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002) (concluding that although nationwide service 
of process statute exists, haling West Virginians into federal court in Washington, D.C., was 
unconstitutional because “the ends of justice [would] not [be] served”).  But see Lisak v. 
Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that when federal question 
subject matter jurisdiction has been established, the Constitution is no bar to nationwide service 
of process).  The Court has not decided the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause has any effect when personal jurisdiction is established per nationwide service of 
process.  The philosophy of two of the Court’s cases may be integral if the Court should ever 
choose to hear the issue.  Compare Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990) 
(asserting that personal jurisdiction over a defendant served with process while physically in the 
forum state is traditionally and historically reasonable) (Scalia, J., plurality), with Ins. Corp. of Ir., 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction 
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.”).  If the Court takes the view 
of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Burnham over that of the “liberty interest” rationale in 
Insurance Corporation of Ireland, minimum contacts may have no application in a Fifth 
Amendment due process analysis, just like it did not in Scalia’s analysis in Burnham.  Burnham, 
495 U.S. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., plurality). 
 217. See, e.g., Casad, supra note 85, at 1601-02 (discussing the view that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause should account for an overall fairness test as opposed to a 
national contacts test).  For cases indicating, however, that even where a nationwide service of 
process statute applies, the defendant must still have contacts with the forum state as the 
Fourteenth Amendment mandates, see Doll v. James Madison Martin Assocs. (Holdings) Ltd., 
600 F. Supp. 510, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 
1331, 1336-37 (D. Colo. 1983). 
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It is crucial at this juncture to remember that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause is a restriction on the assertion of personal jurisdiction by 
a particular forum state over a non-resident of that state.  In federal question 
cases in federal court involving nationwide service of process, however, the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies only when the defendant is not a resident of 
the United States.218  When considering, therefore, the fairness of the forum 
into which the defendant is being dragged, the Court’s interpretation of the 
reasonableness factors is not completely on point.  Such an interpretation is 
one well-suited for state court jurisdictional issues, but not for federal court 
jurisdictional issues under nationwide service of process.219  One legal scholar 
has proposed that the Court examine a broad view of the parties in determining 
whether personal jurisdiction would be reasonable in nationwide service of 
process cases.  Factors included would be a realization that the congressional 
purpose in providing for nationwide service is to provide for a convenient 
forum for the plaintiff (putting less emphasis on the defendants’ rights), the 
particular transaction underlying the lawsuit and its relationship to the forum, 
and the nature of the litigation and its relationship to the forum.220 
It is quite inefficient, however, to put aside the Court’s reasonableness 
factors when determining the fairness/reasonableness inquiry of personal 
jurisdiction in nationwide service cases.  After all, the factors are already set 
out by the Court and are ready for use.  Because the Court has not explicitly 
decided the constitutionality of nationwide service of process statutes, and 
given the fact that the Court has left the reasonableness factors of Burger King 
alone for over fifteen years, it seems very likely that Congress would have the 
power to enact a nationwide service of process statute based on a nationwide 
minimum contacts analysis.  In addition, the burden of persuasion in the 
unconstitutionality of jurisdiction, due to extreme hardship to the defendant, 
would rest upon the defendant. 
VI.  MIGRANT WORKERS AND THE NEED FOR A NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF 
PROCESS AMENDMENT TO THE AWPA 
A nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA will not only 
diffuse the unpredictability that exists in asserting personal jurisdiction over 
farm owners, but it will also help migrant workers to assert their rights in 
courts located close to the security of their personal residences.  When migrant 
 
 218. See generally Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
 219. For a discussion on construing a reasonableness standard for personal jurisdiction cases 
under nationwide service of process statutes, see the very thorough analysis in Robert A. Lusardi, 
Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. 
L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 220. See id. at 40. 
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workers’ socio-economic conditions are considered, amending the AWPA 
provides migrant workers with a useful tool to better their lives on an 
aggregate level. 
This Part is subdivided into five Sections that portray the difficulties 
migrant workers will face in trying to understand, let alone use, the complex 
legal system.  Section A will set forth a brief overview of the general lifestyle 
of a migrant worker.  Section B will detail the problem of poverty that has 
stricken migrant workers.  Section C will discuss the migrant worker’s lack of 
education, which makes them more vulnerable to farm owners taking 
advantage of them.  All three Sections give substantial support for allowing 
migrant workers to litigate their claims under the AWPA near the security of 
their homes.  Section D will consider the problem of finding legal 
representation in the farm employer’s state.  This lack of legal assistance is a 
major justification for a nationwide service of process amendment to the 
AWPA.  Finally, Section E suggests the application of a nationwide service of 
process amendment to the AWPA. 
A. The Migrant Worker’s Lifestyle 
Today’s migrant workers are arguably worse off with respect to economic 
and social progress than they were in previous decades.221  The conditions that 
migrant workers face during the course of their sporadic employment is 
unquestionably harsh.222  Migrant workers are often “subjected to . . . unsafe 
equipment, unhealthy sprays and pesticides, crude and unsanitary living 
conditions, exploitation in infinite ways by their . . . employers, [and] lack of 
care of any kind by anyone.”223  As such, the migrant workers truly are pitted 
at the lowest levels of the American social hierarchy.  The migrant workers in 
America feed this nation, yet few are accustomed to the American lifestyle.  
Migrant workers “arrive where they’re needed . . . by necessity and, at times, 
desperation.”224  Migrant workers accept the hardships of their daily toil 
because they have little else to rely upon.  “The powerlessness of farmworkers 
breeds dependence, which serves to marginalize and isolate” them from other 
possible advantages and opportunities available to others in society.225  
Notwithstanding congressional recognition of the problems facing migrant 
workers, the problems and abuses confronting migrant farm workers have not 
been resolved.226  With little help from government enforcement of federal 
 
 221. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at x. 
 222. For a specific account of migrant work life in Texas, see Viviana Patino, Migrant Farm 
Worker Advocacy: Empowering the Invisible Laborer, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (1987). 
 223. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, MIGRANT WORKERS: A CASTE OF DESPAIR 4 (1981). 
 224. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 2. 
 225. Id. at 25. 
 226. Id. at 50. 
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statutes such as the AWPA, migrant workers have resorted to last-ditch efforts 
of pleading their case to the consumers who purchase the fruits of their 
labor.227 
The generally harsh and uncomfortable lifestyle of migrant workers is 
made even worse by the troubling factor that migrant workers are not able to 
treat most health defects that may arise from their employment.  Assurance of 
ample health care is sometimes impossible for migrant workers to obtain.  
They tend to suffer from diseases more often than the mainstream 
population.228  The average migrant worker lives on this planet for less than 
fifty years.229  “The infection and parasitic disease rates of migrants are 200-
500 percent higher than the national averages.”230  The atrociously substandard 
environment that migrant workers endure breeds infections and diseases, and 
coupled with low income levels, they simply do not have the advantages of 
medical care that mainstream Americans take for granted.231  Little support for 
remedying migrant workers’ health problems is found in the general 
population, thus questioning the effectiveness that pleading their case to the 
public will actually have.232  Moreover, the farm owners are often leading 
advocates against health protections for migrant workers.  The only person, 
other than a possible labor contractor, that the migrant workers regularly 
encounter during their employment simply does not care about them.233  Legal 
woes aside, the day-to-day life of a migrant worker in the field can be a 
struggle merely to stay alive. 
B. Migrant Workers—The Impoverished Class (Low Wages) 
As mentioned above, agricultural fieldwork is not typically desirable 
employment.234  Long hours, instability in length of employment, and low 
wages are all contributing factors that make the life of a migrant worker 
 
 227. See John Nicols, Migrant Farm Workers Take Their Case to the Court of Public 
Opinion, MARKET TO MARKET: THE WKLY. J. OF RURAL AM. (May 10, 2002), at 
http://www.iptv.org/mtom/feature.cfm?Fid=108. 
 228. Nat’l Ctr. for Farm Worker Health, Inc., Fact Sheets About Farmworkers: Profile of a 
Population with Complex Health Problems, at http://www.ncfh.org/factsheets_02.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2003) (“The on-going battle to improve the health status of farmworkers has not 
been easy, and is being lost.”). 
 229. See GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 34. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. (finding that “only 8 percent of migrant farm workers [see] a doctor each year”). 
 232. See id. at 38-39 (“Migrants are viewed as outsiders, as beneficiaries of . . . unnecessary 
federal protection, [and] cause . . . drains on the overall local economy.”). 
 233. See id. at 39. 
 234. See generally DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & MONICA L. HEPPEL, BALANCING 
ACTS: TOWARD A FAIR BARGAIN ON SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS  (1999) (hereinafter 
BALANCING ACTS). 
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difficult.235  A 1997 survey indicated that farm workers receive a weekly pay 
rate of about $277, less than half of the median American worker.236  In fact, 
the median annual income of migrant workers is usually capped near a 
devastatingly low $5,000.237  Furthermore, it is unlikely that migrant workers 
will have sufficient skills to obtain other forms of employment.  This is 
especially true when one considers the fact that farm work is only available in 
sporadic cycles, making employment in non-agricultural settings fairly 
complicated, because few employers outside of agriculture are willing to allow 
workers to work only at sporadic time intervals.238  The unfortunate reality 
facing the migrant worker is that little of his already limited income may be 
feasibly saved.  Debts incurred during the off work cycles coupled with the 
fact that payment is needed for rent, clothes, and food  undoubtedly leave the 
migrant worker in a state of despair.239 
A U.S. Department of Labor study conducted in March 2000 found that 
nearly one-tenth of migrant workers were working at an hourly wage rate 
below the federal minimum of $5.15 per hour.240  To exacerbate the problem, 
real purchasing power of migrant workers in the United States has also been 
declining.241  This low level of income has defined migrant workers “as the 
poorest of American workers.”242 
Aside from measuring the low flow variable of income, migrant workers 
fare much worse than mainstream Americans when accounting for their stock 
of wealth.  Nearly one-third of migrant workers have no assets to call their 
own.  While the most common asset that a migrant farm worker owns is a 
vehicle,243 half of all migrant workers do not have one.  The fact that migrant 
 
 235. See id. at 10-11; GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 3 (finding that for migrant farm workers, 
“[t]he work day is long . . . and with little rest”). 
 236. BALANCING ACTS, supra note 234, at 10.  See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Findings from the 
National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 1997-1998: A Demographic and Employment 
Profile of United States Farmworkers, at 33 (Mar. 2000), at 
http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/agworker/report_8.pdf [hereinafter Findings from the NAWS] 
(finding that the average reported hourly wage of farm workers is $5.94). 
 237. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, National Agricultural Workers: Income and Poverty, at 
http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/agworker/report/ch3.htm [hereinafter National Agricultural 
Workers: Income and Poverty] (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).  “Three-fourth’s [of migrant workers 
earn] less than $10,000 annually.”  Id.  Over 60% of migrant workers live below the national 
poverty level.  Id.  This percentage has increased from 50% reported a decade ago, thus indicating 
that the conditions of migrant workers are still deteriorating.  Id. 
 238. Id. (asserting that three-fourths of migrant workers engage in farm work only). 
 239. See STEPHEN H. SOSNICK, HIRED HANDS: SEASONAL FARM WORKERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 68-69 (1978); see also ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 24-25 (concluding that migrant 
workers “are forced to bear the burden of virtually all of the costs associated with” their work). 
 240. See Findings From the NAWS, supra note 236, at 33. 
 241. Id. 
 242. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 24. 
 243. See National Agricultural Workers: Income and Poverty, supra note 237. 
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workers must—of necessity—travel to wherever work is available intensifies 
the traveling expenses that the workers are likely to encounter.244 
It is more than evident that migrant workers are, generally, poverty-striken 
individuals.  Entry into the legal system to remedy violations of personal rights 
is complicated by the obstacle of financial woes.  The procedural problem of 
personal jurisdiction is only one more problem that migrant workers must face.  
Congress can alleviate some of the difficulties of litigating violations under the 
AWPA by amending the federal statute to allow for nationwide service of 
process when personal jurisdiction would be reasonable.  This would eliminate 
the need for the Court’s minimum contacts test, which is too often 
unpredictable. 
C. Migrant Workers’ Lack of Education 
In addition to the financial difficulties facing migrant workers face, their 
lack of education weakens their ability to understand and use the legal system 
to their benefit.  In some sense, migrancy breeds migrancy.  Education is a 
useful key to unlocking closed doors blocking the path of migrant workers.  
Migrant children, however, are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to 
obtaining an effective education that could take them out of the migrant 
environment.245  Because a migrant family is always on the move, it is very 
rare for a migrant child to remain in one school and develop meaningful 
educational qualities like children in mainstream America.  The lack of 
financial resources imposes a significant burden on migrant children from 
obtaining the proper supplies necessary for a useful education.  At home, 
parents typically work long days in the field, which leaves the children with 
little parental guidance and little hope that education will be garnered in the 
home.246 
The median education level of migrant workers is at about the sixth 
grade.247  Furthermore, one-fifth of workers have not even completed more 
than three years of formal education.248  Although the great majority of 
migrant workers do not own English as a native language, but rather 
Spanish,249 85% of farm workers report that they “would have difficulty 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. See GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 46.  For a proposal of migrant educational reform, see 
Michelle Holleman’s thorough Comment on the problems of the current educational workings in 
place for migrant children.  Michelle R. Holleman, Comment, All Children Can Learn: Providing 
Equal Educational Opportunities For Migrant Students, 4 SCHOLAR 113 (2001) (footnote 
omitted). 
 246. See GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 46. 
 247. Findings From the NAWS, supra note 236, at 13. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
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obtaining information from printed materials in any language.”250  To make 
matters worse, migrant workers are so preoccupied with their day-to-day 
struggles that the value of a meaningful education does not take precedence.  
For example, as one migrant worker from Michigan stated, “Migrants only 
think about today.  They don’t think about what tomorrow might bring.  That’s 
why there’s lots of migrant parents that don’t take education seriously.  They 
can’t justify an education over having their kids be providers for the family.”251 
It is therefore not surprising that “[m]igrant students are . . . the most 
educationally disenfranchised group of students in [the] schooling system.”252  
The problem with having an entire social class of children that remains unable 
to obtain a meaningful education is that the social class necessarily will fail to 
better itself.  Migrant children usually grow to be migrant adults, and the 
vicious cycle continues.253  The poor education of migrant workers will make it 
difficult for the workers to understand the complex legal system designed to 
protect them, let alone recognize that such rights as the AWPA exist. 
D. The Problem of Finding Meaningful Legal Assistance 
Because migrant workers as a class of individuals are some of the poorest 
people in society, problems arise in simply finding competent attorneys that 
are willing and able to assist them.  Because of the lack of education in the 
migrant communities, migrants without lawyers will have little hope in 
litigating claims that they will not even be able to understand. 
Equal justice for all is a fundamental concept embedded in this country’s 
view of fairness.  The quality of our judicial process is valued largely by the 
service provided to those in poverty.254  Millions of Americans, however, lack 
any access to the legal system at all, and an overwhelming majority of those in 
poverty lack access to civil legal necessities.255  The problem that exists for 
 
 250. Id. at 16. 
 251. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 274 (interviewing Jose Martinez, a migrant worker from 
Lawrence, Michigan).  The failure to encourage migrant children to become educated is at the 
root of the educational problem plaguing migrant workers.  Migrant workers born into the system 
grow up believing that what they have is all they can obtain out of life.  See id. at 276; see also 
Patino, supra note 222, at 46.  Moreover, migrant children often face a hostile environment at 
school, from not only peers, but also from teachers and administrators.  See GOLDFARB, supra 
note 223, at 47. 
 252. Ablerado Villarreal & Anita Tijerina Revilla, Creative Educational Opportunities for 
Migrant Students, INTERCULTURAL DEV. RES. ASS’N NEWSLETTER (Feb. 1998), at 
http://www.idra.org/Newslttr/1998/Feb/Lalo.htm. 
 253. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 3 (including a migrant worker’s statement about the fact 
that he is such a worker: “See . . . you is you.  You got that thing.  You can’t be nobody else.  
That’s why this name, migrant worker, stands tall.”). 
 254. Lewis J. Liman, The Quality of Justice, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 287, 287 (1998). 
 255. See, e.g., Access to Justice Development Campaign 2000: The Case for Support, 79 
MICH. B.J. 370, 370 (2000); Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First 
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those in poverty, like migrant workers, is simply being able to find a lawyer 
who is willing and able to provide legal assistance.256  Unlike many other 
industrialized countries,257 the United States has never provided a guaranteed 
right to legal assistance in civil cases.258  This is seemingly contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s position in Griffin v. Illinois,259 where the Court noted “there 
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the 
amount of money he has.”260  Furthermore, “[t]he right to be heard would be, 
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by 
counsel.”261  Because migrant workers will not be guaranteed a right to 
assistance of counsel in litigating their claims under the AWPA, and because it 
is highly unlikely that migrant workers will be able to litigate themselves, due 
to their extreme poverty and lack of education, they will necessarily turn to 
civil public interest organizations, namely the Legal Services Corporation262 
(LSC) for help.  The connection between personal jurisdiction in the migrant 
worker context and the use of the LSC by the workers has its origins in the 
congressional restrictions placed on the LSC.  These restrictions impact on the 
 
Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 402 (1998).  For one 
judge’s proposal that the United States implement a “Civil Gideon,” see Hon. Robert W. Sweet, 
Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503 (1998).  “Civil 
Gideon” refers to the proposed right to counsel in civil lawsuits.  Id. at 503. 
 256. Patino, supra note 222, at 46 (noting that although legal protections for migrant workers 
exist, “few legal advocates know how to use them”). 
 257. Great Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Greece, and the European 
Court of Human Rights all have recognized the right to counsel in civil cases.  See Sweet, supra 
note 255, at 504. 
 258. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (asserting that the right to 
appointed counsel only exists when the defendant “may be deprived of his physical liberty”).  For 
a summary of court cases that refuse to intervene to help financially downtrodden parties in civil 
matters, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-35 to –52 (2d ed. 
1988). 
 259. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 260. Id. at 19. 
 261. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
 262. Congress established the LSC “for the purpose of providing financial support for legal 
assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal 
assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000).  Congress noted that justice is best promoted when all 
have access to legal services.  See id. § 2996(3).  The primary method for providing legal 
assistance and services to the poor is through the LSC.  See Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of The 
Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our National Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 743-44.  LSC serves clients in every state and county in the United 
States, as well as Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Micronesia.  See Legal Servs. Corp., 
Serving the Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans: A Special Report to Congress, at 1 
(Apr. 30, 2000), at www.lsc.gov/pressr/EXSUM.pdf.  The LSC was specially funded for assisting 
the plight of the migrant workers.  Id.  Because this Comment is centered on the issue of personal 
jurisdiction in the migrant worker context, an in-depth analysis into the workings of the LSC is 
not warranted. 
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forum in which migrant workers will be forced to sue their farm employer 
under the AWPA. 
In 1996, the United States Congress imposed certain restrictions on the 
LSC.  In addition to restricting the financial support that the LSC receives, 
Congress enacted legislation restricting LSC attorneys from: (1) undertaking 
class action lawsuits;263 (2) challenging state or federal welfare reform 
legislation or regulations;264 (3) legislative lobbying;265 (4) participating in 
administrative rulemaking proceedings;266 (5) representation of certain 
 
 263. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (2002).  “Class action means a lawsuit filed as, or otherwise declared 
by the court having jurisdiction over the case to be, a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Id. § 1617.2.  For the federal requirements necessary for 
classification as a class action in federal court, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  Rule 23(a) reads: 
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
Id. 
 264. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3 (2002) provides: 
[Legal Service Corporation] recipients may not initiate legal representation, or participate 
in any other way in litigation, lobbying or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a 
Federal or State welfare system.  Prohibited activities include participation in: 
(a) Litigation challenging laws or regulations enacted as part of an effort to reform a 
Federal or State welfare system. 
(b) Rulemaking involving proposals that are being considered to implement an effort 
to reform a Federal or State welfare system. 
(c) Lobbying before legislative or administrative bodies undertaken directly or 
through grassroots efforts involving pending or proposed legislation that is part of an 
effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system. 
Id. 
This prohibition on LSC attorneys representing clients in challenging the welfare reform laws 
was recently held to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.  
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).  The Court in Velazquez did not 
determine the constitutionality of the other restrictions placed on the recipients of Legal Services 
Corporation.  See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the 
Courts?: Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers 
on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 876 (2002).  Abel and Udell argue that 
Congress erred in restricting the LSC because doing so “interfere[s] with [the] core functions of 
the courts.”  Id. at 874. 
 265. 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1 (2002). 
 266. Id. § 1612.1.  Another regulation provides: 
[Legal Service Corporation] recipients shall not attempt to influence: 
(1) The passage or defeat of any legislation or constitutional amendment; 
(2) Any initiative, or any referendum or any similar procedure of the Congress, any 
State legislature, any local council, or any similar governing body acting in any 
legislative capacity; 
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aliens;267 (6) representation of incarcerated persons in federal and state 
prisons;268 and (7) representation of persons convicted or accused of illegal 
drug activities in certain public housing eviction proceedings.269 
These restrictions on the LSC have had devastating effects on the funding 
available to legal aid lawyers.  With respect to the financial effect of the 1996 
federal restrictions, two commentators stated: 
Over $780 million in funds are dedicated annually to the provision of civil 
legal services nationwide. Several hundred million dollars come from federal 
funding allocated to LSC, and hundreds of millions of additional dollars come 
from federal, state and local governments, IOLTA funds, and private donations 
(including those of foundations, corporations, bar associations, and lawyer 
fund drives).  The federal restrictions applicable to LSC funding encumber 
approximately $329.3 million in 2002.  These funds finance advocacy in more 
than 200 legal services offices spread throughout the fifty states and several 
federal territories. These offices provide representation in roughly one million 
matters annually.  The LSC restrictions also encumber almost $300 million of 
the resources that LSC grantees receive annually from federal, state and local 
governments, IOLTA funds, and various private sources.  An additional $62 
million in non-LSC funds carries an independent set of restrictions, imposed in 
most instances by state or local governments or IOLTA governing structures.  
In total, approximately $660 million in scarce legal services funding is 
 
(3) Any provision in a legislative measure appropriating funds to, or defining or 
limiting the functions or authority of, the recipient or the Corporation; or, 
(4) The conduct of oversight proceedings concerning the recipient or the Corporation. 
Id. § 1612.3(a). 
 267. Id. § 1626.3 (providing that LSC “recipients may not provide legal assistance for or on 
behalf of an ineligible alien”). 
 268. Id. § 1637.3.  This regulation states: 
A recipient [of the Legal Services Corporation] may not participate in any civil litigation 
on behalf of a person who is incarcerated in a Federal, State or local prison, whether as a 
plaintiff or as a defendant, nor may a recipient participate on behalf of such an 
incarcerated person in any administrative proceeding challenging the conditions of 
incarceration. 
Id. 
 269. Id. § 1633.3.  This regulation states: 
Recipients [of the Legal Services Corporation] are prohibited from defending any person 
in a proceeding to evict that person from a public housing project if: 
(a) The person has been charged with or has been convicted of the illegal sale, 
distribution, or manufacture of a controlled substance, or possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to sell or distribute; and 
(b) The eviction proceeding is brought by a public housing agency on the basis that 
the illegal drug activity for which the person has been charged or for which the person 
has been convicted threatens the health or safety of other tenants residing in the public 
housing project or employees of the public housing agency. 
Id. 
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encumbered each year by restrictions: this amounts to about eighty-five 
percent of all legal services funding.270 
The encumbrances to funding caused by the federal restrictions are clearly 
enormous. 
The restriction having the most significant impact on a migrant worker’s 
choice of forum when suing a non-resident farm owner is the restriction on 
class action lawsuits.271  It will be more costly to serve rural groups, such as 
migrant workers, with the increased emphasis on individual representation as 
opposed to class action lawsuits.272  It is already the case that “civil legal 
services to the poor in rural areas is more costly than in urban areas.”273  
Without the use of class action lawsuits, LSC attorneys will be unable to 
provide assistance to migrant workers on an individual basis, even when many 
migrants may complain of the same violations by the same farm employer.  
This is because the LSC will not have the financial capacity to accommodate 
so many individual lawsuits. 
Class action lawsuits are integral if migrant workers are to use effectively 
the legal system.  For example, migrant workers are likely to be geographically 
detached, thus causing havoc in coordinating every worker’s individualized 
presence at one court.274  The migrant class members will not necessarily be 
fluent in English, and, therefore, they will not understand the legal system on 
an individual basis.275  The migrant workers will lack financial resources to 
take proper legal measures on their own.276  Also, migrant workers’ remedies 
 
 270. Abel & Udell, supra note 264, at 881 (footnotes omitted).  “IOLTA” stands for “Interest 
on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts,” and it provides financial support for legal aid to indigents 
incapable of mustering an attorney’s fees to file a claim in court.  See Tracy Daniel, IOLTA 
Program Provides Access to Justice, 63 ALA. LAW. 369, 369 (2002). 
 271. Because migrant workers at a similar job site are large in number, the migrant workers 
will file suit against the defendant farm employer together.  This is usually done as a class action 
lawsuit.  See generally Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1983); Rodriguez v. Carlson, 166 
F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Wash. 1996); Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting, Inc., No. CIV-89-1282-PHX-RCB, 
1993 WL 432402 (D. Ariz. May 7, 1993); Leyva v. Buley, 125 F.R.D. 512 (E.D. Wash. 1989); 
Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568 (E.D.N.C. 1986). 
 272. See Larry R. Spain, The Opportunities and Challenges of Providing Equal Access to 
Justice in Rural Communities, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 367, 374 (2001). 
 273. See id.  Even pre-dating the Congressional funding restrictions on the LSC, different 
states conducting studies concluded that Legal Services attorneys were equipped to handle only 
up to 20% of the civil legal needs in their populations.  See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy 
Thoennes, Assessing the Legal Needs of the Poor in Colorado, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 200 
(1986). 
 274. See Saur v. Snappy Apple Farm, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 281, 286 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. 
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in pursuing a private right of action under the AWPA are not sufficiently high 
to entice them to file suits on individual bases.277 
The relationship between the prohibition on class action lawsuits with 
personal jurisdiction is best explained through a hypothetical.278  Suppose 
migrant workers in state B decide that they want to sue a farm employer 
residing in state A in a class action suit279 for violating the AWPA.  The 
migrants will have to sue the farm employer in state A if asserting personal 
jurisdiction over the farm employer in state B is not constitutional.  The 
migrants, however, will still need to rely on LSC attorneys in state A to 
provide legal assistance, but the LSC attorneys in state A may be so limited in 
resources, and, of course, restricted in undertaking a class action lawsuit, that 
the state A attorneys will not be able to provide assistance in litigating the 
migrants’ claims.  To intensify the problem, the workers will not be able to 
comprehend the legal system they are engaged in (because of poverty and lack 
of education),280 as well as having difficulty finding attorneys not associated 
with the LSC to represent them (because there is no “Civil Gideon”).281  The 
attorneys in state A will already be overburdened by their cases in state A, and 
the end result is that the courtroom doors in state A will be closed to the 
migrant workers.  The migrants will be forced to litigate in their home state B, 
but an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident farm employer 
will be extremely unpredictable.  Ultimately, it may be a lose-lose situation for 
the migrant worker. 
Magnifying the problem of LSC attorneys not being able to partake in 
class action suits on behalf of the migrant workers is the likelihood that the 
attorneys will be hesitant in accepting migrant worker cases at all.  Such 
attorneys—who are unable to finance resources necessary to represent the poor 
effectively—will be unwilling to accept migrant worker cases because they 
will be unsure whether courts in their home state will be able to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the farm owner. 282  Instead of wasting scarce 
resources on claims that may be dismissed, 283 LSC attorneys will redirect their 
 
 277. See id.  The court in Saur stated that “few claims [under the AWPA would] be litigated” 
without the use of class actions.  Id. at 287 n.4. 
 278. This Comment’s underlying hypothetical presented at supra Part I was that the migrant 
workers were abused in the farm employer’s state after being hired by the farm employer, and the 
workers then wished to pursue a cause of action in their home state. 
 279. See supra note 271. 
 280. See supra Part VI.B-C. 
 281. See Sweet, supra note 255, at 503.  “Civil Gideon” refers to the proposed right to 
counsel in civil lawsuits.  Id.  See also supra note 257. 
 282. See supra Part IV. 
 283. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (stating that a party to a suit may, on motion to the court, 
assert that the court has a “lack of jurisdiction over the [party]”). 
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limited resources to claims that are more predictable, thus isolating migrant 
workers further from the legal community. 
E. Applying the Nationwide Service of Process Amendment in the Migrant 
Worker Context 
The problems stemming from the lack of legal assistance available to 
migrant workers will be relieved by making it easier for migrant workers to use 
the legal system to their advantage.284  If the migrant workers cannot get into 
the courtroom, then there is no opportunity that the AWPA will be effective in 
reducing the abuses such workers face.  Congress must amend the AWPA to 
include a nationwide service of process provision so that the goals of the 
AWPA can be effectively reached.285  More specifically, Congress should 
enact a federal nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA that 
provides for any district court having subject matter jurisdiction under the 
AWPA to also have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  The 
amendment’s wording should include such language that a presumption of 
constitutional personal jurisdiction would exist, but also that this presumption 
may be rebutted by the farm owner in the very rare instances when haling the 
farm owner into a distant state would be extremely burdensome. 
Without a doubt, a certain level of unpredictability in determining personal 
jurisdiction will remain if a per se reasonable nationwide service of process 
amendment is not enacted.  It is unlikely, however, that the Court would 
uphold such an amendment as constitutional.  This is especially true after the 
long history of focusing on the defendant’s rights that the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment has witnessed. 
In most cases, however, it will be such that personal jurisdiction over the 
non-resident farm owner will be constitutional.  The nationwide minimum 
contacts test will be met when the defendant is within the borders of the United 
States.  In the migrant worker cases brought in federal district courts stemming 
under the AWPA (a federal statute), the farm owner will be present within the 
United States and will have conducted his farming activities that caused the 
harm in the United States as well.  The nationwide minimum contacts will not 
really be relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but its presence in the 
constitutionality of the nationwide service statute will save an alien farm owner 
from an unfair assertion of a court’s jurisdiction over him. 
 
 284. The federal government has provided for funds to be allocated to the LSC so that its 
attorneys may “prepare complaints and fund lawsuits against state agencies, [labor] contractors, 
and [farm] growers.”  ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 229.  Although protections under the law, 
such as the AWPA, exist for migrant workers, “few legal advocates know how to use” these laws 
effectively to help assert the rights of their migrant worker clients.  Patino, supra note 222, at 46. 
 285. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4547 
(stating that the purpose of the AWPA is to reach the “goal of fairness and equity for migrant 
workers”). 
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As for the reasonableness of jurisdiction inquiry, the farm owner must 
“present a compelling” case that the reasonableness factors warrant a finding 
that jurisdiction is unconstitutional.286  To assert that a non-resident farm 
owner would be per se forced to litigate in even the most burdensome forum 
would be repugnant to the notion that the Court has continually supported the 
due process rights of the defendant.  As Judge Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit 
stated in Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.:287 
  In order to evaluate whether the Fifth Amendment requirements of fairness 
and reasonableness have been satisfied, courts should balance the burdens 
imposed on the individual defendant against the federal interest involved in the 
litigation.  As in other due process inquiries, the balancing seeks to determine 
if the infringement on individual liberty has been justified sufficiently by 
reference to important governmental interests. 
  . . . [C]ourts must engage in this balancing only if a defendant has 
established that his liberty interests actually have been infringed.  Only when a 
defendant . . . has “present[ed] a compelling case that . . . would render 
jurisdiction unreasonable” should courts weigh the federal interests favoring 
the exercise of jurisdiction. 
  In determining whether the defendant has met his burden of establishing 
constitutionally significant inconvenience, courts should consider the factors 
used in determining fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Courts should 
not, however, apply these factors mechanically in cases involving federal 
statutes [because] . . . “[t]he due process concerns of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments are not precisely parallel.”288 
It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court will simply disregard the fairness 
rights of the farm owner because Congress is acting through the Fifth 
Amendment.289 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Congress has the power to enact a nationwide service of process statute for 
federally-created rights litigated in federal courts.  Only the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits this power.  Such an assertion of 
personal jurisdiction would, therefore, not be tested against the Supreme 
 
 286. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); see also Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 440 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that only 
in “rare cases” will an inconvenience to the defendant in litigating in the particular forum “defeat 
the reasonableness of jurisdiction”). 
 287. 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 288. Id. at 946 (citations omitted). 
 289. See Lescs v. Martinsburg Police Dep’t, No. 02-5062, 2002 WL 1998177, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 29, 2002) (holding that, although a nationwide service of process statute existed, forcing the 
non-resident defendant into the forum of the district court was unfair and unconstitutional). 
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Court’s minimum contacts analysis of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Determining whether minimum contacts will even exist in the migrant 
worker context can prove to be unpredictable.  Furthermore, under the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it is clear that not obtaining minimum contacts 
over farm owners will force migrant workers to travel to a distant location that 
does have such contacts.  Given the social conditions of migrants, this will not 
happen.  Although a nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA 
may seem like a small procedural device, it is essential to allow migrant 
workers effective access to the courtroom. 
It is unlikely that migrant workers will be financially capable of litigating a 
suit hundreds, or even thousands, of miles from their home, given their highly 
impoverished status and the federal restrictions on LSC attorneys from 
partaking in class action suits.  Moreover, migrant workers will not be willing 
to sue their employer during the course of their employment.  With the meager 
income and unstable availability of work, migrant workers will fear that suing 
the farm owner while employed only will result in the quick termination of 
employment.290  When a migrant worker is forced to choose between suing his 
employer or remaining in the fields so that he can feed his hungry family, the 
options quickly fade from two choices to just one.  Unless migrant workers 
have access to the courts near the security of their personal homes, it is 
unlikely that they will invoke their private right of action for violations 
stemming under the AWPA. 
Qualifying the nationwide service of process amendment to allow for a 
rebuttable presumption of a constitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction 
will assure non-resident farm owners that they will not be unreasonably forced 
to litigate in distant forums.  Unfortunately, the unpredictability of determining 
personal jurisdiction will still hang over migrant workers’ heads because 
personal jurisdiction under the AWPA will not be per se constitutional.  The 
unpredictability, however, in determining the existence of personal jurisdiction 
will be the exception instead of the rule.  The weight of the Burger King 
factors291 will typically balance in favor of constitutionally asserting personal 
jurisdiction because of the extremely poor conditions migrant workers are 
positioned in, as Justice Levine pointed out in Rios.  A fair balance between 
farm owner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights can be 
harmonized through this service of process amendment.  Moreover, such a 
combination fits well within the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the personal 
 
 290. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 275 (interviewing Jose Martinez, a migrant worker from 
Lawrence, Michigan: “A lot of [employers] view migrants as disposable labor.  When they want 
workers, they bring them up, and when they don’t want them anymore, they send them back 
to . . . wherever they’re from.”). 
 291. See supra note 17. 
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jurisdiction doctrine as being that of an “evolving” standard.292  In this respect, 
the AWPA amendment is a subset of the evolving nature of the Court’s view 
of personal jurisdiction.  By allowing migrant workers the procedural tool of 
nationwide service of process, migrant workers will be given a chance to assert 
their rights under federal law, and therefore be given at least the opportunity to 
enter through the courtroom doors. 
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